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INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND GROUP RIGHTS IN 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY’S APPROACH 
TO MINORITY LANGUAGES 
ROBERT F. WEBER* 
INTRODUCTION 
The European Union (EU)1 is a supranational entity comprised 
of twenty-five member states, and vests rights with the individual 
citizens of those Member States.  However, Europe as a cultural 
space consists of many more constitutive groups that are currently left 
out of the structural legal framework of European integration.  
Minority language groups, in particular, have been the subject of 
efforts by Member States to protect and preserve linguistic diversity 
within their borders.  The extent and variety of solutions employed by 
Member States to protect their resident autochthonous languages 
testifies to the importance of accommodating minority languages into 
the European legal landscape. 
The thesis of this Article is that the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) jurisprudence puts the legality of these measures in jeopardy, 
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 1. The European Union is comprised of three “pillars”: the European Community (EC or 
Community), the Common Foreign and Security Policy, and the Police and Judicial Co-
operation in Criminal Matters pillar.  This article is concerned exclusively with the EC, which is 
itself comprised of various institutions, including, most importantly, the European Parliament, 
the European Council, the European Court of Justice, and the European Commission.  The 
various treaties discussed herein have created and defined all three pillars, but the institutions 
that are charged with defining, enforcing, and explicating the important non–discrimination 
norms are all part of the EC, and have little relevance in the context of the other pillars.  
References therefore will be made to “EC law” and “the EC” to describe the relevant 
institutions and laws.  There is one important exception to this rule of thumb: the crucial 
concept of “citizenship” is referred to as “EU citizenship,” following the example of Article 17 
of the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which refers to “Citizenship of the 
Union.”  Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 17, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 11, 
as amended by Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 1, as amended by Treaty of 
Nice, Feb. 26, 2001, 2001 O.J. (C 80) 1, consolidated version reprinted in 2002 O.J. (C 325) 33 
[hereinafter EC Treaty]. 
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and that to ensure the continued vitality of minority languages within 
the Member States, it may be necessary to formulate new protective 
strategies to replace some of the old methods whose compatibility 
with the EC Treaty is, by now, dubious.  This Article will be divided 
into three parts that aim: 
(1) to provide a brief overview of the legal structures Member 
States have erected to protect the linguistic and cultural 
diversity within their borders, as well as the efforts made 
by the various EU institutions to do the same; 
(2) to elaborate a theoretical and practical distinction 
between group rights and individual rights; and 
characterize the process of European economic, social, 
and political integration, in contrast to the approach taken 
by the Member States, as fundamentally centered on 
individual, and not group, rights—an approach which is 
inadequate to protect minority languages; and 
(3) to examine the salient ECJ cases in this field in the light of 
the group rights/individual rights distinction, and analyze 
their effect on efforts to protect and preserve minority 
languages and cultures. 
In conclusion, this Article recommends an interpretive strategy that 
would permit the ECJ to consider group rights for minority languages 
as a sui generis subject of Community law and thereby minimize the 
risk that bona fide group-protective measures will run afoul of the 
non-discrimination principle contained in EC Treaty Article 12.  That 
failing, the Article argues further that minority groups and Member 
States should refocus their political efforts to address minority 
language concerns in the EC Treaty itself, since the expanded notion 
of EU citizenship and the ECJ’s willingness to invoke the EC Treaty’s 
non-discrimination principle in new contexts have placed many 
Member State efforts to create minority language group rights in 
potential conflict with the EC Treaty. 
I.  LEGAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL TREATMENT OF 
LINGUISTIC DIVERSITY IN THE MEMBER STATES AND IN 
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 
It is estimated that one out of every eight citizens of the 
European Union speaks a minority language.2  Given that the 1997 
 
 2. Francesco Palermo, The Use of Minority Languages: Recent Developments in EC Law 
and Judgments of the ECJ, 8 MAASTRICHT J. EURO. & COMP. L. 299, 299 (2001). 
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Treaty of Amsterdam  included the first and only treaty reference 
solely directed to minority populations,3 it is hardly surprising that the 
Member States have addressed the issue of minorities independently 
of the EC.  The Member States’ attempts at accommodating 
minorities have taken on different forms, and have achieved varying 
success.  Because the legal treatment of minorities (and minority 
languages in particular) has been guided primarily by the Member 
States, any study of minority rights must begin there, before 
proceeding to the EC’s—and the ECJ’s— treatment of the issue.  In 
other words, to know how European integration affects minority 
rights, it is essential to analyze the current domestic protections for 
these groups, and how these legal protections may conflict with the 
EC Treaty. 
Five modes of addressing minorities in Member State law are 
most prevalent4: first, formal constitutional recognition of multiple 
official languages; second, constitutional incorporation of protection 
for linguistic minorities; third, establishing autonomous zones or 
communities with special language rights; fourth, central legislative 
accommodation and recognition; and fifth, permitting small scale, 
informal local measures designed to accommodate minority 
languages.  Most Member States employ hybrid forms of protection 
for their minority cultures and languages, making use of multiple 
protective strategies.  What follows is a representative sample of 
strategies utilized by various Member States to incorporate linguistic 
minority protection. 
A. Formal Constitutional Recognition of Multiple Official 
Languages 
When a minority language achieves official status, it obtains a 
unique legal status within the state.5  Often, citizens may invoke a 
 
 3. Id. at 300. 
 4. The division into five categories is rough and by no means complete.  Nearly all 
Member States make use of several protective legal measures.  The division into five categories 
serves only to highlight some of the more prominent legal structures. 
 5. An example from the United States is the Hawaiian Constitution, which provides that 
“English and Hawaiian shall be the official languages of Hawaii.”  HAW. CONST. art. XV, § 4.  
However, Hawaiian “shall be required for public acts and transactions only as provided by law.”  
Id.  The state legislature has ruled out mandatory use of Hawaiian, enacting a statute that 
succinctly states, “Hawaiian shall not be required for public acts and transactions.”  HAW. REV. 
STAT.  § 1-13 (2006).  In addition, the legislature has enacted a sort of supremacy provision that 
gives binding effect to the English version of a law “[w]henever there is found to exist any 
radical and irreconcilable difference.”  Id.  The jurisprudence addressing Article XV, § 4 has 
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right to utilize the minority language in any official capacity.  Official 
documents must often be provided in the official minority language as 
well.  The most obvious case of formal constitutional recognition is 
Ireland.  Ireland’s Constitution declares that the Irish language 
(Gaeilge, in Irish) is the “first official language” of Ireland, though it 
technically a minority language, and less frequently used than 
English—the “second” official language.6  Finland is another 
example, where the Swedish-speaking minority is protected by the 
official status of Swedish in Finland.7   
Through a unique constitutional apparatus, the Belgian 
Constitution impliedly recognizes three official languages.  Belgium 
can be divided into three ethno-linguistic groupings, with a Flemish-
speaking majority (about fifty-five percent), a sizable francophone 
minority (about forty percent) and a small but significant regionally 
concentrated German-speaking population (about five percent).8  
Article 2 of the Belgian Constitution divides Belgium into three 
“Communities”: a German-speaking Community, a Flemish-speaking 
Community, and a French-speaking Community.9  In addition, Article 
3 provides that Belgium is comprised of three regions: the Walloon 
region, the Flemish region, and the Brussels region.10  Roughly 
speaking, the francophone Community resides in Walloon, along with 
the German-speaking minority.11  Brussels is split between Flemish 
 
interpreted the provision restrictively, and courts, as a general matter, do not seem to be too apt 
to read implied rights to invoke Hawaiian language rights where such rights are not necessary.  
See, e.g., Tagupa v. Odo, 843 F.Supp 630, 631 (D. Haw. 1994) (upholding a magistrate judge’s 
grant of a protective order denying a deponent the “right” to conduct a deposition in Hawaiian 
despite deponent’s fluency in English). 
 6. IR. CONST. art. 8, available at http://www.taoiseach.gov.ie/attached_files/Pdf%20files/ 
Constitution%20of%20IrelandNov2004.pdf.  Interestingly, Ireland was the only signatory to the 
treaties that did not require that its national and official language should be a working language 
of the European Community.  See Niamh Nic Shuibhne, The Impact of European Law on 
Linguistic Diversity, 5 IRISH J. EURO. L. 63, 69 (1996); but see infra note 91. 
 7. The Finnish Constitution establishes both Finnish and Swedish as national languages.  
See SUOMEN PERUSTUSLAKI [Constitution] art. 17 (Finland), available at http://www.om.fi/ 
uploads/54begu60narbnv_1.pdf (last visited Feb. 16, 2006). 
 8. See Lloyd Cutler & Herman Schwartz, Constitutional Reform in Czechoslovakia: E 
Duobus Unum?, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 511, 551-52 (1991). 
 9. See BELG. CONST. art. 2. 
 10. The Belgian Constitution also creates four “linguistic regions” including the three 
spoken languages and the bilingual Brussels area.  See BELG. CONST. art. 4.  This division is 
more symbolic than of juridical consequence, where the regional and community groupings 
emerge as more relevant. 
 11. 4 NEW ENCYC. BRITANNICA 828 (15th ed. 1986). 
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and French speakers.12  The Walloon region and the Flemish region 
are located, respectively, in southern and northern Belgium.  Each 
Community elects a Community Council to act on its behalf.13  The 
constitution lays out a complicated scheme of government that grants 
to the linguistic communities varying degrees of autonomy over core 
cultural competences including education, cultural policy, and inter-
Community cooperation.  A sort of minority veto exists as well.  The 
Communities are grouped in the federal parliament such that if three-
quarters of a linguistic group believe a proposed law threatens to 
“gravely damage” inter-Community relations, the dissenting group 
may halt the legislative process and initiate a set of special review 
procedures.14  The regional governments are elected by the 
Community Councils15 and their powers are derived from devolutions 
from the federal government.16 
Notably, and unlike the Finnish and Irish examples, Belgium’s 
federal constitution does not recognize any official languages per se,17 
but instead attempts to map its constitutional system onto an already-
existing linguistic situation.  The regions and Communities 
themselves must determine, by way of procedures outlined in the 
federal constitution, the trajectory of their own linguistic policy.18  To 
use the popular legal binary, Belgium is concerned primarily with 
granting procedural rights to linguistic groups, and eschews 
substantive rights at the federal level.  Though German is an 
“implied” official language, rights to use German are limited in scope 
geographically; it is officially recognized in only the nine 
municipalities that make up the German-speaking Community.19  In 
 
 12. 4 NEW ENCYC. BRITANNICA 584 (15th ed. 1986). 
 13. See BELG. CONST. arts. 115-21. 
 14. See id. art. 54; see also Cutler & Schwartz, supra note 8 at 551-52. 
 15. See BELG. CONST. art. 122. 
 16. See id. art. 39. 
 17. The regions, by contrast, do have official languages.  The official language of the 
Flemish Region is Dutch.  The official languages of the Walloon Region are Dutch and French.  
The Brussels Region is also officially bilingual.  See Venice Comm’n, Venice, Italy, Mar. 8-9, 
2002, On Possible Groups of Persons to which the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities Could Be Applied in Belgium, CDL-AD 1, para. 22 (2002) (Mar. 12, 2002), 
available at http://www.venice.coe.int/docs/2002/CDL(2002)021-e.asp. 
 18. BELG. CONST. arts. 129-30. 
 19. See Wouter Pas, A Dynamic Federalism Built on Static Principles: The Case of Belgium, 
in FEDERALISM, SUBNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS, AND MINORITY RIGHTS 157, 158-59 (G. Alan 
Tarr, et al. eds., 2004) (“In 1970, the Belgian State was divided into four territorial linguistic 
regions: The Dutch-speaking region, the French-speaking region, the bilingual region of 
Brussels-Capital, and the German-speaking region . . . . The authorities in each region may, in 
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addition, the federal government has granted German speakers 
limited rights to use German in administrative capacities in a small 
group of municipalities in the French-speaking Walloon region.20  
Thus, though the constitution recognizes the German-speaking 
minority and incorporates it into the constitutional order, on the 
ground German speakers can rely on limited regional rights.  The 
constitution thus divides Belgium’s geographic space according to the 
languages spoken in those regions.  The Belgian Constitution 
presupposes an interaction between minority language groups and the 
majority Flemish Community on the federal and regional levels. 
B. Constitutional Mandate to Protect Minorities 
A state’s constitution may mandate that the state take certain 
action to protect the linguistic diversity contained within its borders.  
In such an arrangement, the linguistic policy is distributed, pursuant 
to the constitutional mandate, top-down from the central government 
instead of horizontally from a sub-state entity.  Italy is the Member 
State wherein the largest number of minority populations reside.21  
Article 6 charges the Italian Republic with “protect[ing] [its] linguistic 
minorities with appropriate [norms].”22  Nevertheless, and in part due 
to the protections already in place from the regions system,23 the 
Italian Parliament passed general protective legislation pursuant to its 
Article 6 powers in 1999—fifty-one years after the Constitution 
entered into force. 
The 1999 law protects the language and culture of the Albanian, 
Catalán, German, Greek, Slovene, and Croat populations, as well as 
those speaking French Provençal, Friulan, Ladin, Occitan, and 
Sardinian.24  Of particular note is the categorization of minority group 
 
principle, only use the official language of that region in their dealings with citizens.”); Venice 
Comm’n, supra note 17, para. 21. 
 20. Venice Comm’n, supra note 17, para. 27. 
 21. An estimated 2.5 million people belong to at least twelve minority groups within Italy.  
Francesco Palermo, The Never-Ending Story? The Italian Draft Bill on Linguistic Minorities, in 
MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 55, 55 (Snezana Trifunovska ed.,  2001). 
 22. COST. art. 6 (Italy) (translation is the author’s).  The centrality of this article is 
emphasized by its location after articles 4 and 5 (guaranteeing the right to work and respecting 
the autonomy of localities) and before articles 7 and 8 (dividing the Italian republic from the 
Vatican and establishing freedom of religion). 
 23. See discussion infra part I.C.  Indeed, the 1999 law does not apply to the five regions 
that have passed more protective legislation regarding minority languages.  Palermo, supra note 
21, at 61. 
 24. Law n.482, 297 Gazz. Uff., Dec. 20, 1999, art. 2 [hereinafter 1999 Law], available at 
http://www.parlamento.it/leggi/99482l.htm. 
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rights.  Parliament singled out groups25 in need (or deserving, in the 
eyes of some of the right-leaning political parties26) of protection, 
rather than establishing minimum guarantees generally applicable to 
all individual citizens.  Of course, such treatment may be inevitable 
for effective protection mandated by Article 6, but it also underscores 
the gravamen of that constitutional mandate: to protect linguistic and 
cultural minorities means to protect designated groups of citizens. 
The effect of the 1999 law is to establish a minimum level of 
protection in accordance with Article 6, but only for the enumerated 
minorities.  A few of the salient provisions of the law include: 
permission for kindergarten instruction in minority languages,27 and 
teaching minority culture and traditions in elementary and secondary 
schools;28 permission to use minority languages in dealings with 
government offices and entities including before justices of the peace 
(low-level judges);29 and authority for the regions to enter into 
agreements regarding transmission of programming relevant to 
minorities, as well as permission for regions to grant financial aid to 
the media to implement use of minority languages.30 
C. Decentralized Autonomous Zones Regulating Their Own 
Language Policy 
Decentralization involves a central state ceding some of its 
authority in the cultural-linguistic realm to sub-state political entities 
and institutions, usually on a territorial basis.  Decentralization is 
short of a full-blown federal system, where a sub-state entity may be 
granted limited sovereignty.  However, by decentralizing or devolving 
control over the linguistic sphere of government activity, 
decentralization improves efficiency, as well as enhancing democracy 
 
 25. And did so crudely, perhaps, at least to a reader versed in American Fourteenth 
Amendment jurisprudence.  Antoni Milian i Massana makes the same point, in a slightly 
different context, referring to the Province of Bolzano’s separation of German- and Italian-
speaking students.  To Massana, the “separate but equal” idea fails when the criteria for 
separation of students bears no relation to the education of the students—a circumstance that 
distinguishes racist segregation from functional linguistic separation.  ANTONI MILIAN I 
MASSANA, DERECHOS LINGUÏSTICOS Y DERECHO FUNDAMENTAL A LA EDUCACIÓN: UN 
ESTUDIO COMPARADO: ITALIA, BELGICA, SUIZA, CANADA, Y ESPAÑA 134-37 (1994). 
 26. Palermo, supra note 21, at 63. 
 27. 1999 Law, arts. 4-6. 
 28. Id. art. 4(2). 
 29. Id. arts. 7, 9. 
 30. Id. arts. 12, 14. 
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and legitimacy.31  Ultimately, because sovereignty is not shared, the 
sub-state authorities are responsible to the central state.32 
Italy provides an instructive example of decentralization.  In 
addition to its constitutionally-mandated protective competence, the 
Italian Constitution sets up a system of regions, and grants limited 
autonomous status to the five regions where linguistic minorities are 
most entrenched: Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Val d’Aosta, Trentino-Alto 
Adige, Sardegna, and Sicilia.  The rights that attach to minority 
speakers originate in legislation passed by the regional governments, 
and such rights are connected to the territory, not the residents, of the 
regions.33 
Spain’s 1978 Constitution adopts a similar decentralized 
constitutional system with respect to its autochthonous languages.34  
Despite establishing Castilian as the official language of Spain, the 
preamble to the Constitution “proclaims its intention [p]rotect all 
Spaniards and peoples of Spain in the exercise of human rights, of 
their cultures and traditions, and of their languages and institutions.”35  
The inclusion of “languages” in a preamble’s laundry list falls short of 
the unambiguous protective mandate contained in Article 6 of the 
Italian Constitution, but nevertheless indicates the central role Spain 
plays in protecting Spanish language and culture.  Article 2, in turn, 
guarantees a “right to autonomy” for the “nationalities and regions of 
which [Spain] is composed.”36 
As far as decentralized linguistic policy is concerned, the more 
interesting passage is Article 3 of the Spanish Constitution, which 
explains how the “right to autonomy” is exercised in the linguistic 
realm.  Article 3, after establishing Castilian as the official language 
 
 31. See Montserrat Guibernau, Nations Without States: Political Communities in the Global 
Age, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1251, 1260 (2004). 
 32. See id. at 1261. 
 33. For example, a French-speaking inhabitant of the Val d’Aosta can only make use of her 
language rights within the Val d’Aosta, and may not rely on those protection outside the region.  
This anomaly results in part from the Italian Parliament’s decision not to expand regional 
language rights to a nationwide application.  See Palermo, supra note 21, at 55-56; see also Case 
C-274/96, Criminal Proceedings against Bickel and Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637. 
 34. See generally, C.E. arts. 143-58 (Spain).  For a more complete discussion of the Spanish 
Constitution and linguistic rights, see Giovanni Poggeschi’s appropriately titled article The 
Linguistic Struggle in the Almost Federal Spanish System, in THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
POLITICAL REGULATION OF ETHNIC RELATIONS AND CONFLICTS 313, 315 (Mitja Žagar, Boris 
Jesih & Romana Bešter eds., 1999). 
 35. C.E. pmbl. (emphasis added) (translation is the author’s), available at 
http://www.boe.es/datos_iberlex/normativa/TL/ConstitucionINGLES.pdf. 
 36. Id. art. 2. 
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of Spain, declares that the “remaining Spanish languages also have 
official status in the autonomous communities, in accordance with 
their respective Statutes.”37  Among the seventeen autonomous 
communities, provided for in the Constitution itself, are various 
groups that have historically had languages of their own (as well as 
nationalist aspirations), such as Catalonia, the Basque Country, and 
Galicia.38  The basic law for the autonomous communities is found in 
their respective Statutes of Autonomy.  Pursuant to Article 3 of the 
Constitution, the Aragon’s Statute of Autonomy promises a 
forthcoming law (yet to arrive) protecting Aragonese,39 and Catalán 
enjoys equal status with Castilian in Catalonia, 40 the Balearic 
Islands,41and Valencia.42  Galician is an official language in Galicia,43 
and the Basque language has official status (along with Castilian, of 
course) in the Autonomous Basque Community,44 as well as limited 
recognition in the community of Navarra.45 
The autonomous communities effect linguistic politics and 
legislation on a regional level, providing local protection for the local 
languages.  The example of Catalonia is instructive as to how the 
system functions.  Prior to August 2006, the linguistic policy of 
Catalonia was determined by the Ley de política lingüística which the 
Catalán Parliament (or Generalitat)46 enacted in 1997 under the 
 
 37. Id. art. 3.  The Spanish Constitution does not use the term “minority” as the Italian 
Constitution does.  Giovanni Poggeschi hypothesizes that this absence may be due to the 
greater proportion of Spaniards who communicate in an alternate language.  See Giovanni 
Poggeschi, Linguistic Rights in Spain, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN EUROPE 85, supra note 21. 
 38. See Guibernau, supra note 31, at 1262; see also Montserrat Guibernau, Spain: Catalonia 
and the Basque Country, in DEMOCRACY AND CULTURAL DIVERSITY 55 (Michael O’Neill & 
Dennis Austin eds., 2000). 
 39. Statute of Autonomy for Aragon, art. 7, available at http://www.aragob.es/pre/ 
cido/estatut1.htm (last visited June 18, 2007). 
 40. The Catalonian Statute of Autonomy goes one step further than the analogous 
provisions in other Statutes of Autonomy, and actually declares Catalán to be the “preferred” 
language for official use.  Statute of Autonomy for Catalunya, art. 6.1 (2006). 
 41. Statute of Autonomy for the Balearic Islands, art. 3.1. 
 42. Statute of Autonomy for the Valencian Community, art. 7. 
 43. Recent events exposed a less salubrious effect of minority language policy in Galicia.  
Due to a new law requiring Galician language ability for all public service employees, there was 
a critical shortage of firefighters to battle the fires afflicting Galicia during the summer of 2006.  
See Observer, Ridiculous in Any Language, FIN. TIMES: FT.COM, Aug. 10, 2006, www.ft.com 
(search for “Galicia” and “experienced firefighters). 
 44. Statute of Autonomy for the Basque Country, art. 6. 
 45. Statute of Autonomy for Navarra, art 9.2. 
 46. Each autonomous community has a single chamber legislative assembly.  Following 
regional elections, the leader of the majority party usually assumes the presidency of the 
03__WEBER.DOC 10/4/2007  9:52:56 AM 
370 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:361 
jurisdiction of the autonomous community and in accordance with 
Article 148(17) of the Spanish Constitution concerning the rights of 
the communities to teach in the local language and encourage 
minority culture and research.47  The law reaffirmed the official status 
of Catalán, and included a right to be answered in Catalán by a 
person in the public administration.48  The law also included a number 
of provisions encouraging the use of Catalán in universities.49  The 
most striking aim of that law concerned the use of Catalán by the 
media and in the sphere of economic activity.  All radio and TV 
channels operating within Catalonia must broadcast at least 50% of 
the time in Catalán, and radio music must include twenty-five percent 
Catalán or Aranese songs.50  The law contained further ambitious 
intrusions aimed at stimulating many fields of culture industry.51 
However, in August 2006, Catalonian linguistic policy underwent 
an epochal transformation with the entry into force of a new Statute 
of Autonomy, approved by the Catalonian voters on July 18, 2006.  
The new Statute goes much further than the Ley de política 
lingüística.  Now, Catalán is “the language of normal and preferential 
use in Public Administration bodies and in the public media of 
Catalonia.”52  Perhaps even more significantly, the Statute makes 
Catalán “the language of normal use for teaching and learning in the 
educational system.”53  The Statute also grants official status to 
Occitan, one dialect of which, Aranese, is spoken in the province of 
Aran in Catalonia.54  Article 33.1 of the Statute grants to citizens “the 
right to linguistic choice.”55  However, later the Article refers to “each 
individual[‘s] . . . right to use the official language of his or her 
choice.”56  It is unclear whether this distinction between citizen and 
 
community.  For a discussion of the political institutions of the autonomous communities, see 
Guibernau, supra note 31, at 1262-63. 
 47. Ley de política lingüística, 1/1998, Jan. 7, 1998. 
 48. See id. arts. 2-3. 
 49. See, e.g., id. art. 22. 
 50. See id. art. 26. 
 51. See generally Poggeschi, The Linguistic Struggle, supra note 34; Poggeschi, Linguistic 
Rights in Spain, supra note 37. 
 52. Statute of Autonomy of Catalunya, art. 6.1. 
 53. Id. art. 35.1 (“Catalán shall be used as the teaching and learning language for university 
and non-university education.”). 
 54. Id. art. 6.5.  Practically speaking, only “citizens of Aran” possess the right to deal with 
the Generalitat in Occitan.  Id. art. 36.2. 
 55. Id. art. 33.1. 
 56. Id. 
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individual57 will affect the treatment of Catalán speakers in practice, 
or whether all persons will be able to avail themselves of the right to 
use Catalán.  The right to linguistic choice applies to all 
administrative, notarial, registration, or judicial procedures.58  
Communications by Catalonian public officials will be executed in 
Catalán, without prejudice to the rights of Castilian speakers.59  There 
is even a “right to be attended” to in Catalán that can be invoked 
against private establishments, provided they are “open to the 
public.”60 
D. Affirmative Protection and Recognition from Central 
Government 
Lacking the decentralized regional, or community, structure of 
Spain and Italy, other Member States administer similar policies from 
the central government authorities.  In the Netherlands, for instance, 
the Frisian language is spoken in Friesland, a province with a 
population of 610,000.61  Almost fifty-five percent of the provincial 
population considers Frisian to be their mother tongue, and about 
seventy-five percent know how to speak it.62  The Dutch government 
has stated formally that, along with Dutch, Frisian is an indigenous 
language of the Netherlands.63  Parliament has gone beyond mere 
recognition, by enacting measures aimed at accommodating Frisian 
speakers in Friesland, including inter alia: detailed rules on the use of 
Frisian in an administrative or judicial capacity; rules establishing the 
legal basis for changing toponymical names from Dutch into Frisian; 
and provisions to encourage the use of Frisian in schools.64 
Though the Frisian language is not threatened, and seems to be 
enjoying a wide range of accommodating measures from the central 
Dutch government, it must be remembered that the Dutch 
 
 57. In U.S. law, the distinction between citizen and person has a particular importance in 
the context of the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.  See generally Richard A. 
Epstein, Of Citizens and Persons: Reconstructing the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, 1 N.Y.U. J. L. & LIB. 334 (2005). 
 58. Statute of Autonomy of Catalunya, arts. 33.1-2. 
 59. Id. art. 50.5. 
 60. Id. art. 34. 
 61. Floris Van Laanen, The Frisian Language in the Netherlands, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN 
EUROPE, supra note 21, at 67, 69. 
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. 
 64. Id. at 70, 76-79. 
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Constitution is silent with respect to minority languages,65 and that the 
Friesland province has no decentralized grant of authority, from the 
constitution or otherwise, to take affirmative protective measures.  In 
the Netherlands, the central government guarantees minority 
language rights primarily pursuant to treaty obligations.66  Similar 
concessions are made for the Mirandés community in northern 
Portugal.67 
Another fascinating permutation of this strategy resulted in the 
“Good Friday Agreement” entered into between Ireland and the 
United Kingdom in 1998.  That treaty, among other more urgent 
objectives, granted limited formal recognition to Irish and various 
dialects of Scots in Northern Ireland.68 
In recent years, the United Kingdom has made similar 
allowances for the 659,000 Welsh speakers in Wales69 and the sixty 
thousand Scottish Gaelic speakers in Scotland.70  Prior to 1993, the 
United Kingdom merely provided a limited discretion for local judges 
and administrative officials to permit the use of Welsh.  With the 
passage of the Welsh Language Act of 1993, Parliament placed the 
Welsh language on official status with English in dealings with the 
public sector.71  The Welsh Language Act breaks with a predominant 
policy of Anglicization and represents a significant change in the 
United Kingdom’s posture regarding the Welsh minority living in the 
United Kingdom.72  Parliament made a similar, though less expansive, 
 
 65. Indeed, the Netherlands is one of two members of the EC having a written constitution 
that has no mention of official languages.  The other is Denmark.  Id. at 72. 
 66. In other words, the requirement in Dutch law to respect linguistic minorities comes 
from Dutch accession to international agreements rather than an internal constitutional 
mandate.  See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 
U.N.T.S. 171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 67. See Lei n.7/99, Reconhecimento oficial de direitos linguísticos da comunidade 
mirandesa (official recognition of the language rights of the Mirandes Community); see also 
Despacho Normativo n. 35/99 (implementing regulations to provide Mirandés education, 
including a limited grant of power to local institutions (entidades da comunidade) to participate 
in the coordination of cultural and educational projects). 
 68. Agreement Reached in the Multi-Party Negotiations, U.K.-Ir., Apr. 10, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 
751, 769-70 (1998) [hereinafter Good Friday Agreement]. 
 69. Omniglot Writing Systems & Languages of the World: Welsh (Cymraeg), 
http://www.omniglot.com/writing/welsh (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). 
 70. Omniglot Writing Systems & Languages of the World: Scottish Gaelic (Gàidhlig), 
http://www.omniglot.com/writing/gaelic (last visited Apr. 16, 2007). 
 71. See Welsh Language Act, 1993, c. 38 (U.K.). 
 72. Cf. Leila Sadat Wexler, Official English, Nationalism, and Linguistic Terror: A French 
Lesson, 71 WASH. L. REV. 285, 337 nn. 215-16 (1996) (discussing examples of the United 
Kingdom’s monolingual tendencies). 
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overture to the Scottish Gaelic speakers by promulgating the Gaelic 
Language (Scotland) Act 2005.73  That act granted a limited official 
status to Scottish Gaelic in Scotland. 
E. Nonmandatory and Discretionary Accommodation 
A fifth mode of Member States’ linguistic accommodation—
nonmandatory accommodation—is prevalent, most notably, in 
France.  France, more than any other Member State, has adopted the 
“ostrich approach” to its minority languages—sticking its head in the 
sand rather than acknowledging its linguistic minorities in any 
meaningful way.74  Article 2 of the French Constitution is notably the 
only article of that document addressing language: “French is the 
language of the Republic.”75  Postcolonial France has been the 
prototype of an assimilation-oriented society,76 and has yet to extend 
formal recognition to its autochthonous minority languages, despite 
the fact that an estimated 9 million French citizens speak a minority 
language.77  Indeed, the French accession to the European Charter of 
Regional and Minority Languages was stonewalled by the high 
French Constitutional Council because certain provisions in the 
Charter purported to create group rights (in violation of the unity of 
the French Republic) and to grant quasi-official status to minority 
languages (in violation of Article 2 of the Constitution).78  The French 
 
 73. Gaelic Language (Scotland) Act,  2005, c. 7 (U.K.). 
 74. See Adeno Addis, Cultural Integrity and Political Unity: The Politics of Language in 
Multilingual States, 33 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 719, 730-31 (2001). 
 75. LA CONSTITUTION art. 2 (Fr.) (translation is the author’s). 
 76. See Palermo, supra note 2, at 302 (discussing the unitary conception of French 
citoyenneté).  Cf. Law No. 75-1349 of Dec. 31, 1975, Journal Officiel de la République Franiçaise 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 4, 1976, p. 189 (known as “la loi Bas-Lauriol”).  That 
law rendered obligatory the use of the French language for various commercial activities, so 
much so that recourse to foreign words is prohibited except where there is no similar French 
expression.  In the field of language policy, Suzanne Citron relates much of French 
intransigency and repression of its minority languages back to the leaders of the Third Republic 
(1870-1940) who, as “heirs of the revolutionaries, were, like [their ancestor revolutionaries], 
impervious to the idea that cultures other than their own [French] culture could exist in 
France.”  SUZANNE CITRON, L’HISTOIRE DE FRANCE: AUTREMENT 174 (1992) (translation is 
the author’s). 
 77. See Les 75 langues minoritaires de France, L’HUMANITE (Fr.), June 25, 1999, available 
at http://www.humanite.fr/journal/1999-06-25/1999-06-25-29195. 
 78. See CC decision no. 99-412DC, June 15, 1999, Rec. 71 (Fr.).  One commentator has 
suggested that the Conseil constitutionnel’s sweeping conclusions all but extinguished the hope 
for focused constitutional amendments designed to clear the way for passage of the Charter.  
See Karin Oellers–Frahm, International Decision: Charte Éuropéenne des Langues Régionales 
ou Minoritaires, 93 AM. J. INT’L L. 913, 938-41 (1999). 
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government has passed a handful of administrative decrees and laws 
regarding the school instruction of minority languages, as well as their 
presence in the mass media.79  Such measures are predictably 
toothless, and are nearly always phrased so as to give ultimate 
discretion to the teachers, school administration, or those exerting 
control over the public media.80 
F. European Community Efforts to Protect Minority Languages 
While Member States have developed an elaborate architecture 
of minority language rights, the European Community has not 
pursued the point with comparable zeal—at least not at the legal 
level.81  Indeed, the EC does not formally recognize linguistic 
minorities.82  This is not to say the EC has not visited the issue of 
regional and minority languages; to the contrary, the EC institutions 
have made numerous soft law pronouncements and funded projects 
to protect minority languages.  The EC should be commended for its 
growing concern about minority rights, but this Article argues that 
such efforts are limited by the structural incompatibility of European 
integration with the legal protection of regional and minority 
linguistic groups.  Nevertheless, the EC seems determined to protect, 
 
 79. See, e.g., Law No. 51-46 of Jan. 11, 1951, Journal Officiel de la République Française 
[J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], Jan. 13, 1951, p. 483 (known as “la Loi Deixonne”) 
(permitting school instructors to draw on local languages when doing so would benefit 
instructors’ lesson plans, particularly when teaching the French language).  See also Law No. 84-
52 of Jan. 26, 1984 Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of 
France], Jan. 27, 1984, p. 431, 432 (known as “la Loi Savary”) (requiring the government to “see 
to the promotion and enrichment of the French language, as well as the regional languages and 
cultures.”).  Such treatment was extended to all levels of education in 1989.  Law No. 89-486 of 
July 10, 1989, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] [Official Gazette of France], 
July 14, 1989, p. 8860 (explaining that instruction in local langages forms an important basis of 
general education at all levels).  For media, a decree was issued in 1987 urging the national radio 
authorities to contribute “to the expression and information of cultural, social, and professional 
communities.”  See Décret of Nov. 13, 1987, Journal Officiel de la République Française [J.O.] 
[Official Gazette of France], Nov. 15, 1987, p. 13326, arts. 3,6. 
 80. See id. 
 81. See Daniela Caruso, Limits of the Classic Method: Positive Action in the European 
Union After the New Equality Directives, 44 HARV. INT’L L. J. 331, 358-59 (2003).  In her 
otherwise searching article, Professor Caruso puts too little emphasis on the current structural 
incompatibility of Community law with protection of minority rights.  It is not enough to say the 
“complex legacy of the economic integration project” constitutes an “institutional limit” 
burdening the “Union’s commitment to minority languages.”  Id. at 358.  The ethos of the 
integration project has been universalizing and centered on individual rights, and not group 
rights.  This point is discussed in more detail below. 
 82. Palermo, supra note 2, at 299. 
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albeit within its limited sphere of competences, such languages, and 
some of its prominent efforts are described here. 
1. Soft Law and Project Funding.  The European Parliament, 
for instance, passed four Resolutions between 1981 and 1994 
regarding the situation of minority language communities.83  In 
response to the 1981 Resolution,84 Parliament created the European 
Bureau of Lesser Used Languages (EBLUL) in 1982.85  That same 
year, Parliament initiated the B3-1006 budget line, entitled 
“Promotion of Regional and Minority Languages,” which provides 
funds for financing measures supporting minority languages.86  
Parliament used B3-1006 to finance projects to sustain regional and 
minority languages, including the EUROMOSAIC network87 and 
MERCATOR,88 and provided support for studies on the interface of 
language and integration.89 
 
 83. See Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and Cultures and on a 
Charter of Rights of Ethnic Minorities, 1981 O.J. (C287) 106; Resolution on Measures in Favour 
of Linguistic and Cultural Minorities, 1983 O.J. C68/103; Resolution on the Languages and 
Cultures of the Regional and Ethnic Minorities in the European Community, 1987 O.J. (C318) 
160 (regretting the lack of progress made in response to previous resolutions); Resolution on 
Linguistic Minorities in the European Community, 1994 O.J. (C61) 110. 
 84. Called the “Arfé resolution” after the Italian Rapporteur, Gaetano Arfé.  See 
Resolution on a Community Charter of Regional Languages and on a Charter for Rights of 
Ethnic Minorities, 1981 O.J. (C 287) 106-07. 
 85. The EBLUL has as its mission the promotion of active EC policy-making in favor of 
regional or minority languages and the defense of linguistic rights.  The languages EBLUL aim 
to protect are indigenous, and do not include the languages of immigrant communities, or 
dialects of official Member State languages.  EBLUL considers itself to be representative of 
over fifty million EU citizens.  EBLUL is not a Community institution, but is funded mainly by 
the Commission.  See generally European Commission, Education and Training: Regional and 
Minority Languages, http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages/langmin/eblul_ 
en.html (brief description of EBLUL’s history and mission, providing a link to the EBLUL 
website). 
 86. A budget line is an addendum annually appropriated by the Parliament devoting funds 
to an area of its choosing.  Budget Line B3-1006 has been renewed every year since its 
inception.  See Gabriel von Toggenburg, The EU’s Endeavours for its Minorities, in MINORITY 
RIGHTS IN EUROPE, supra note 21, at 205, 214 n.30. 
 87. The EUROMOSAIC network combines resources and scholars from Barcelona’s 
Institut de Sociolinguistica Catalana, the Centre du recherche sur le plurilinguisme in Brussels, 
and Bangor’s Research Centre Wales.  Id. at 215. 
 88. MERCATOR “is a computer database which aims to improve” the circulation of 
information regarding minority languages within and without the EC.  Adam Biscoe, The 
European Union and Minority Nations, in MINORITY RIGHTS IN THE ‘NEW’ EUROPE 89, 102 
n.48 (Peter Cumper & Steven Wheatley eds., 1999). 
 89. See id. 
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More recently, the European Parliament and the Council of 
Europe joined together to proclaim 2001 as the “European Year of 
Languages.”90  The Commission has also funded a number of 
innovative education projects, covering not only the official languages 
of the Community,91 but minority languages as well.92  The effect of 
these and countless other measures the Community doubtless will 
undertake cannot be measured.  While their effect may escape us, the 
undeniable message is to be applauded: the EC cares about minority 
languages.  However, in the end, these and other such programs lack 
the strictures of legal norms and rules that the Member States already 
have in place. 
In July 2006, the European Parliament granted to speakers of 
Catalán, Basque, or Galician the right to communicate with the EC 
legislature in their native language.93  The success of the Spanish 
minorities is no doubt due in part to their strong domestic political 
position, as well as the recent successes of the Catalán minority in 
expanding its Statute of Autonomy.  Excepting these Spanish 
minority languages, parties may communicate with EC institutions 
only in official EC languages.94  A recent report by the EC Parliament 
Committee on Culture and Education called for all EC institutions to 
“communicate with citizens in their own national” languages, 
irrespective of the official status of the language at the EC or Member 
State level.95 
2. Article 151.  The only hard treaty law prior to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam even acknowledging the existence of minorities within 
the EC is Article 151 of the EC Treaty, which instructs the 
Community to “contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the 
Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity 
and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the 
 
 90. European Parliament and Council Decision 1934/2000, 2000 O.J. (L 232) 1 (EC). 
 91. There are twenty-one working languages of the Community—the official languages of 
each Member State.  On July 13, 2005, Irish was included as a working language effective 
January 2007.  See Andres Ortega, How Brussels is Coping  with the growing Tower of Euro–
babel, FIN. TIMES (London), Jan. 26, 2006, at The Future of Europe 5. 
 92. Caruso, supra note 81, at 359. 
 93. SNP Bid to Boost Gaelic, ABERDEEN PRESS & J., July 6, 2006, at 4. 
 94. Cf. Biscoe, supra note 88. 
 95. Italian Draft Report on a New Framework Strategy for Multilingualism, at 6, COM 
(2005) 0569, June 29, 2006, available at http://eurolang.net/files/draft_multilingualism.pdf.  The 
Draft Report also calls for the amendment of EC Treaty Articles 13 and 151, the inadequacies 
of which are discussed infra.  See id. at 7. 
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fore.”96  Article 151 also instructs the Community to “take cultural 
aspects into account in its action under other provisions of this 
Treaty, in particular in order to respect and to promote diversity of its 
cultures.”97 Article 151 mirrors Article 22 of the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which states that the 
EU “shall respect cultural, religious and linguistic diversity.”98  The 
inclusion of Article 151 in the Maastricht Treaty evinces the 
delegates’ concern with the effects of the integration project on 
regional cultural diversity, but it does not constitute the clear 
competence or mandate that the EC would need to act decisively and 
affirmatively—as the Member States have done—in favor of 
collective group rights for minorities. 
In stark contrast to the core economic Community competences, 
the impact of Article 151 has not produced significant results, and is 
limited to the funding of a small handful of cultural projects.99  
Indeed, some scholars have argued that minorities have benefited 
more from legislation passed under market-based treaty provisions—
relying on a chance confluence of market demands with group 
demands for rights—than under Article 151 itself.100  If that is true, the 
future of minority rights in the EC currently hangs in the balance 
between an unsteady combination with market considerations on the 
one hand, and on the other, a steady stream of funded projects with 
debatable effects. 
3. Protection of Minorities as Accession Criterion.  The fall of 
the Berlin Wall in 1989 awakened the Community to the vital stake it 
had in the stability and progress of its neighbors to the East.101  This 
 
 96. EC Treaty art. 151 (emphasis added). 
 97. Id. 
 98. Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union art. 22, 2000 OJ (C 364) 13.  
The Charter is an ambitious set of commitments assented to by all three legislative-executive 
institutions of the EC.  It has no status as positive law at the moment, however.  It has been 
incorporated into the text of the EU Constitution.  See discussion infra Part I.F.5. 
 99. The most influential programs have been merged into one program entitled 
CULTURE 2000.  See Palermo, supra note 2, at 300 n.6. 
 100. Id. at 300 (mentioning importance of Council Directive of 1977 which provides for 
“education of children of migrant workers in their mother tongue”). 
 101. See FLORENCE BENOÎT-ROHMER, THE MINORITY QUESTION IN EUROPE: TOWARDS A 
COHERENT SYSTEM OF PROTECTION FOR NATIONAL MINORITIES 30-31 (1996).  Benoît-
Rohmer highlights the Pact on Stability (1995), a political undertaking (but not a treaty) signed 
by the members of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe, as a momentous 
achievement for its contribution to stability and management of border conflicts and minority 
issues after the Yugoslav crisis.  The European Union chaired the two regional round table 
conferences. 
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renewed interest found expression in the so-called European 
Agreements with Central and Eastern European nations.102  In 1993, 
at the Copenhagen Summit, the Council adopted a Commission 
Report on enlargement that provided, inter alia, that a condition 
precedent to any eventual accession to the E.C. was respect for and 
protection of the rights of minorities.103  These conditions are now 
embodied in the Community’s Association Agreements, which 
require the recognition of minority nations.104  The EU’s foreign 
policy has focused on the protection of minorities in non-Member 
States outside the accession context as well.105 
Interestingly, there was (and is, pending acceptance of the EU 
Constitution) no such requirement for the current Member States of 
the European Union.  Some commentators have criticized the Union, 
alleging that the recognition of minority rights is an ideal to be 
consumed abroad, but ignored in the internal market.106  Indeed, 
Article 6 of the Treaty on European Union replicates the relevant 
language of the Copenhagen Agreements, but omits the reference to 
the respect and protection of minorities.107  Protection of minority 
rights is a sine qua non for admission into the EC, but once a state 
enters, it seems, rights for the minorities residing within its 
boundaries lose their legal protection.  In a sense, the requirement 
 
 102. The European Agreements included Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, the Czech Republic, 
Bulgaria, and Romania.  Biscoe suggests the interest in East Europe was motivated by a fear of 
“right wing authoritarian and nationalist forces” intent on stepping into the power vacuum.  See 
Biscoe, supra note 88, at 97 (citing DESMOND DINAN, EVER CLOSER UNION: AN 
INTRODUCTION TO EUROPEAN INTEGRATION 478 (3d ed. 2005). 
 103. European Council, June 21-22, 1993, Copenhagen, Den., Presidency Conclusions, SN 
180/93 [hereinafter Presidency Conclusions] (“Membership requires that the candidate country 
has achieved stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human rights and 
respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a functioning market economy as well as 
the capacity to cope with competitive pressure and market forces in the Union.”) (emphasis 
added). 
 104. Biscoe, supra note 88, at 97. 
 105. See id. passim. 
 106. See, e.g., Bruno de Witte, Politics Versus Law in the EU’s Approach to Ethnic 
Minorities, in EUROPE UNBOUND: ENLARGING AND RESHAPING THE BOUNDARIES OF THE 
EUROPEAN UNION 139 (Jan Zielonka ed., 2002) (defining the minority rights requirement as 
“an export product and not one for domestic consumption”); Graínne De Burca, Beyond the 
Charter: How Enlargement Has Enlarged the Human Rights Policy of the European Union, 27 
FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 679, 700-01 (2004). 
 107. Compare Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C 191) 1, as amended by 
Treaty of Amsterdam, Oct. 2, 1997, 1997 O.J. (C 340) 145 (“The Union is founded on the 
principles of liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the 
rule of law, principles which are common to the Member States.”) with Presidency Conclusions, 
supra note 103. 
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emphasizes the blind spot within the EC framework: the EC 
pressures future members to shore up constitutional and legal 
protection for minorities ex ante, because it knows that once 
admitted, such efforts are currently outside the scope of the Treaties, 
and the EC will be powerless to address them.108 
4. Article 13.  The Amsterdam Treaty included Article 13 at the 
urging of those wishing to pressure the EC into solidifying a firm 
foundation for social rights.109  That article applies the non-
discrimination principle embedded in Article 12110 to a wider array of 
situations.  The text reads as follows: 
Without prejudice to the other provisions of this Treaty and within 
its limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community, the 
Council, acting unanimously on a proposal from the Commission 
and after consulting the European Parliament, may take 
appropriate action to combat discrimination based on sex, racial or 
ethnic origin, religion or belief, disability, age or sexual 
orientation.111 
In granting the Community the competence “to take appropriate 
action” to combat discrimination, Article 13 opens a new juridical 
space for Community action.  However, closer examination reveals 
that unanimity is required112 for any action, and the limiting phrase 
“within its limits of the powers conferred by it upon the Community” 
suggests a more modest scope than Article 12’s “within the scope of 
 
 108. It could be argued that the inclusion of a minority rights requirement in the accession 
criteria, which are based on the common constitutional principles of the Member States, implies 
the existence of a common constitutional obligation on the part of all, including current, 
Member States.  See Palermo, supra note 2, at 301.  Such an argument may be internally 
coherent, but the discussion supra on the Member States’ constitutional treatment of minorities 
belies this point.  There is great diversity in treatment, and some Member States still hold tight 
to their “proclaimed homogeneity.”  BENOÎT-ROHMER, supra note 101, at 18 (mentioning 
France and Greece, in particular).  But see Bruno de Witte, Surviving in Babel? Language 
Rights and European Integration, in THE PROTECTION OF MINORITIES AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
277, 278 (Yoram Dinstein & Mala Tabory eds., 1992) (“There seems to be a gradual emergence 
of a common European standard for the treatment of linguistic minorities . . . .”). 
 109. Several European parliamentarians became advocates for minority groups in 
Amsterdam.  See von Toggenburg, supra note 86, at 228. 
 110. EC treaty art. 12. (“Within the scope of application of this Treaty, and without 
prejudice to any special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of 
nationality shall be prohibited.  The Council, acting in accordance with the procedure referred 
to in Article 251, may adopt rules designed to prohibit such discrimination.”). 
 111. Id. art. 13. 
 112. Some commissioners sought, unsuccessfully, to introduce qualified majority voting into 
the Article 13 law-making process.  Von Toggenburg, supra note 86, at 228 n.103. 
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application of this Treaty.”113  Another limitation is the exclusively 
consultative role held by the European Parliament, which is the 
Community organ that minority groups can most easily access.  A still 
more fundamental limitation is the lack of competence for the EC to 
enact measures of positive discrimination in favor of minorities.114 
Nevertheless, Article 13 moves in the right direction to 
protection for minorities in two ways.  First, the Article explicitly 
recognizes that discrimination exists.  Article 13 instructs the 
Community to “combat” a pre-existing problem.115  Second, Article 13 
moves away from market criteria towards a substantive protective 
competence for the EC institutions.  Article 13 authorizes the 
Community to take affirmative measures to eradicate discrimination 
not just based on nationality, but on eight other categories of 
difference.116  It is a small step, but an important one, in the 
development of Community law with respect to minorities.  Even 
though it does not grant the EC carte blanche to legislate on behalf of 
minority groups, Article 13 acknowledges the minority group 
difference that exists in the EC,117 and incorporates it for the first time 
in a grant of power to the Community institutions. 
5. The EU Constitution118 and Minority Languages.  The 
original Draft Constitution for the European Union, presented in July 
2003, omitted any mention of minority rights.119  Advocacy groups 
mobilized to express outrage over the lacuna and obtained some 
interesting language in the amended Constitutional Treaty currently 
subject to popular approval in the respective Member States.  Article 
I-2 states, “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human 
 
 113. This is especially clear after the ECJ’s ruling in Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat 
Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691, which greatly expanded the scope of Article 12 by a broad reading 
of Article 18’s creation of EU citizenship.  EC Treaty art. 12. 
 114. Von Toggenburg, supra note 86, at 230. 
 115. EC Treaty art. 13. 
 116. See id. 
 117. This acknowledgment isevident in the inclusion of discrimination based on “racial or 
ethnic origin,” which would apply equally to non-EC minorities and autochthonous minorities 
within the Member States.  Implicit in the concept of discrimination based on “racial or ethnic 
origin” is discrimination against a minority group. 
 118. The Treaty was signed by Council members on October 29, 2004, and is now open for 
consideration by the various Member States.  Following the “no” votes of France and the 
Netherlands, the momentum for ratification has dissipated. 
 119. See generally European Convention, July 18, 2003, Draft Treaty Establishing a 
Constitution for Europe, CONV 850/03, available at http://european-
convention.eu.int/docs/Treaty/cv00850.en03.pdf. 
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dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for 
human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities.”120  Structurally, this language is front and center: it is the 
fourth sentence, and the second article, of the entire document.  
However, closer examination reveals that it possesses more in 
common with preambular language than anything else.  The phrase is 
descriptive and not prescriptive, and would not create a new 
competence for Community action.  Interestingly, the language 
recalls the Copenhagen criteria for accession discussed supra, and 
may correct the asymmetrical obligations inhering in those criteria.121  
In so doing, the proposed Article I-2 may provide a “lowest common 
denominator” for countries with abysmal records of protecting 
minority rights.  What—if any—the contours of such a minimum 
obligation would be are not apparent from the text and due to the 
general and descriptive quality of the language, it is likely not 
susceptible to an expansive reading by the ECJ.122 
Another passage merits attention.  Article I-3(3) includes in a list 
of the EU’s objectives a hortatory reminder to “respect its rich 
cultural and linguistic diversity, and . . . ensure that Europe’s cultural 
heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”123  This passage, unlike Article 
I-2, formed part of the original July 2003 Draft Constitution.  In it, 
there is the first mention of linguistic diversity in an EU treaty.  
However, the language largely tracks Article 151 and absent a more 
specific command, is unlikely to create an EU competence to act on 
behalf of minority languages. 
Any discussion of the EU Constitution must at least 
acknowledge the events of the Dutch and French “no” votes, and the 
more general failure of the pro-Constitution forces to present a 
compelling case in favor of ratification.124  The reasons for the “no” 
votes, and the successive stalling of the ratification process, are 
manifold.  Whether voters were expressing their desire for “less 
Europe” or for a more coherent Europe (meaning, “yes to Europe, 
 
 120. Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe art. I-2, Oct. 24, 2004, 2004 O.J. (C 310) 
1 [hereinafter European Constitution]. 
 121. See supra notes 106, 108 and accompanying text. 
 122. But see SANFORD LEVINSON, OUR UNDEMOCRATIC CONSTITUTION 12-13 (2006) 
(describing the Preamble to the U.S. Constitution as its most important language). 
 123. European Constitution, supra note 120, art. I-3(3). 
 124. In 2005, France and the Netherlands submitted the ratification to a referendum vote, 
and voters rejected the proposed text soundly.  See French Say Firm ‘No’ to EU Constitution, 
BBC NEWS, May 30, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe4592243.stm; Dutch Say ‘No’ to EU 
Constitution, BBC NEWS, June 2, 2005, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe4601439.stm. 
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but not this Europe”) is a question up for debate,125 but it is 
indisputable that the “no” advocates were able to tap into diffused 
sentiment that held, rightly or wrongly, that the EC was distant from 
its citizens.126  The perception that European integration means 
homogenization of the Member States’ cultures and particularities is 
a common theme that anti-Europe political forces, especially on the 
Right, have made use of repeatedly.127  Of course, the “no” vote is too 
complicated to be reduced to a mere nationalistic appeal to 
sovereignty and identity, but the success of the anti-integration appeal 
to “less Europe” depends in part on the EC’s own failure to take into 
account the continued resonance and relevance of identity in the EU 
citizenry. 
This inadequacy is a broad phenomenon, mostly outside the 
scope of this article.  However, the conflict between individual and 
group rights in the context of minority languages is one particular 
manifestation of this broad failure.  Solving the minority language 
problem will do very little, in itself, to remedy the failure of the pro-
integration forces to construct a compelling narrative as to why 
further integration is desirable, but to the extent that such an 
approach allows the EC to develop a vocabulary sufficient to 
accommodate non-market and cultural realities, it may contribute to 
the discussion of European integration. 
 
 125. See TOMMASO PADOA-SCHIOPPA, EUROPA: UNA PAZIENZA ATTIVA 36-38 (2006). 
 126. See, e.g., Saying “No” to EU Constitution, IRISH TIMES, June 14, 2005, at 17; Robert 
Mason Lee, “Non” and Then “Nee,” MACLEAN’S, June 13, 2005, at 26; see also Andreas 
Follesdal & Simon Hix, Why There Is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone 
and Moravcsik, EUROPEAN GOVERNANCE PAPERS (EUROGOV), NO. C-05-02, at 4-6, available 
at http://www.connex-network.org/eurogov/pdf/egp-connex-C-05-02.pdf; Peter L. Lindseth, 
Democratic Legitimacy and the Administrative Character of Supranationalism: The Example of 
the European Community, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 628, 655 (1999) (“The most fundamental 
[weakness of the EC aspirations as a constitutional order] is that there is not yet any European 
‘people’—no demos—in whom sovereignty can be said to have originally resided, which was 
then constitutionally delegated the Community without going through the intermediation of the 
Member States.”). 
 127. See Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, Eurosceptics in Line for Major Breakthrough on Polling 
Day, DAILY TELEGRAPH (London), June 1, 2004, at 8. 
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II.  EUROPEAN INTEGRATION AND THE CONFLICT 
BETWEEN GROUP RIGHTS AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
A. Individual Versus Group Rights: Why the Distinction Matters 
At this stage, it will be helpful to step back a bit and sketch the 
boundaries of the categories of group rights and individual rights as 
those terms are used in this Article.  So far, it has surveyed some of 
the protective strategies that Member States and the EC employ to 
foster and protect autochthonous groups of minority language 
speakers.  The argument of this article is that some of these measures, 
insofar as they are addressed to groups and not individuals, may 
cause, or create the potential to cause, conflicts with core principles of 
Community law, in particular the non-discrimination principle.  These 
measures are different in key respects from individual rights. 
The generality of the phrase “group rights” may cause some 
confusion.128  If we are to label group privileges as “rights,” then there 
must be some action that separates these “rights” from, say, a mere 
rhetorical appeal to a group or collectivity, with reference to a 
normative prescription.  A legal right, in general, “is an entitlement or 
justified claim that a legal system recognizes” as legitimate according 
to a “correct interpretation of its own rules and principles.”129  As the 
term is used in this article, “group rights” refer to legal entitlements 
or privileges, dispensed by the sovereign, to individuals by virtue of 
their membership to a community.  This definition necessarily 
excludes the rights of a group to, say, self-determination or secession, 
which are addressed to a group qua nation or “people.”  The group 
language rights that are of importance in the context of European 
integration are vested in individuals, but are not available to all 
individuals qua individuals.  Instead, recourse to these rights is 
conditioned on the existence of (1) a relevant group and (2) an 
individual’s membership in that group.  This concept of group rights, 
then, recognizes linguistic minorities as a protectable group, but opts 
to protect individuals belonging to the group rather than protecting 
the group as such.  In this vein, it is possible to speak of “group 
 
 128. An extensive discussion of the concept of group rights can be found in MARLIES 
GALENKAMP, INDIVIDUALISM VERSUS COLLECTIVISM: THE CONCEPT OF COLLECTIVE 
RIGHTS (1998). 
 129. Dwight G. Newman, Collective Interests and Collective Rights, 49 AM. J. JURIS. 127, 128 
(2004). 
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subjectivity” even though the rights are, sensu strictu, granted to 
individuals. 
A cursory discussion of the importance of the “individual” in 
modern thought may provide a helpful background.  Since World 
War II and the establishing of the United Nations, individual rights 
have displaced group rights as the dominant form of protecting 
individuals.130  A U.N. study observed, with respect to the League of 
Nations system of minority protection, that 
[T]his whole system [of minority group protection] was overthrown 
by the Second World War.  All the international decisions reached 
since 1944 have been inspired by a different philosophy.  The idea 
of a general and universal protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is emerging.  It is therefore no longer only 
the minorities in certain countries which receive protection, but all 
human beings in all countries[.]131 
Of course, the emphasis on the individual is hardly a twentieth-
century invention.  One of the key characteristics of modernity is the 
progressive privileging of the individual, in the religious and social, as 
well as the juridical, realms.132  For instance, Christianity re-ordered 
the individual’s relation to the cosmos by putting him in direct 
communion with God.  The Reformation was a further development 
of modern religion’s emphasis on individual communion with the 
divine.  The Renaissance133 and the Enlightenment,134 too, are periods 
thought of primarily in terms of their development of ideas of, 
respectively, humanistic and rationalist individualism.  Radical 
 
 130. See James D. Wilets, The Demise of the Nation-State: Towards a New Theory of the 
State Under International Law, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 193, 206 (1999). 
 131. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/367, at 70 (1950). 
 132. See Victor Segesvary, Group Rights: The Definition of Group Rights in the 
Contemporary Legal Debate Based on Socio-Cultural Analysis, 3 INT’L J. GROUP RTS. 89, 95 
(1995) (discussing the “sacralization” of the individual). 
 133. See, e.g., JACOB BURCKHARDT, THE CIVILIZATION OF THE RENAISSANCE IN ITALY 
98-119 (S.G.C. Middlemore trans., Penguin Books 1990) (1860); see also GIORGIO VASARI, THE 
LIVES OF THE ARTISTS 49-81 (George Bull, trans., 1987) (describing the Renaissance as a 
reawakening of painting from a long slumber spurred on by the individual genius of Tuscan 
artists such as Cimabue and Giotto). 
 134. See, e.g., IMMANUEL KANT, GROUNDING FOR THE METAPHYSICS OF MORALS (James 
W. Ellington trans., Hackett Publishing 3d ed. 1993) (1785) (Moral law requires that humans are 
treated as ends in themselves, and never as means.); Allen W. Wood, The Supreme Principle of 
Morality, in CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO KANT & MODERN PHILOSOPHY 351, 352-54 (Paul 
Guyer ed., 2006).  In a different iteration of Enlightenment individualism, the “social contract” 
models of both John Locke and Jean Jacques Rousseau liberate individuals from the natural law 
framework and make their continued participation in society depend, at least theoretically, on 
their consent. 
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individualism in the form of subjectivism and existentialism 
developed in the first half of twentieth century. 
Unanchored from the values and roots that tied its constituent 
groups together,135 European society in the period leading to the 
Second World War witnessed a radical re-ordering of the State, 
individuals, and groups.  Despite their outward appeals to group 
identity, the fascism and National Socialism that convulsed Europe in 
the 1920s and 1930s were not so much a revival of group solidarity as 
they were symptoms of a growing dissolution of traditional values 
that were enforced in part by group accountability.  The post-World 
War II emphasis on individual rights results from a realization that 
the dissolution of group solidarity left individuals powerless against 
an almighty state.136 
The free-market utopianism of twentieth-century liberalism is a 
different movement in the same direction toward the dominion of the 
individual.  Individual rights have been used to drive the integration 
of post-World War II Europe under the theory that economic 
interdependence would eradicate nationalistic violence and empire 
building.137  The EC can be conceptualized both as a contribution to, 
and consequence of, an ever-increasing individual-centered legal 
rights framework.  Of course, these sketches are rendered with the 
broadest of brushes, and are meant merely as a general evidence of 
 
 135. Martin Heidegger and Max Weber discuss this phenomenon at length from different 
viewpoints.  Compare Martin Heidegger, The Question Concerning Technology, in BASIC 
WRITINGS 307 (David F. Krell, ed., William Lovitt trans., 1993) (1977) (warning that reliance on 
technology threatens to “enframe” the entire human experience and undermine any conception 
of human beings beyond functional means to an end) with Max Weber, Science as a Vocation, in 
ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 129, 155 (H.H. Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds., 1946) (describing 
modernity in terms of rationalization and intellectualization, which “disenchant” man from the 
sense of religiosity that “in former times swept through the great communities like a firebrand, 
welding them together”). 
 136. Hannah Arendt did not consider the modern state’s tendency to centralize and expand 
political life to be, in and of itself, problematic.  Instead, the totalitarian problem resulted when 
nationalist ideology became conflated with the state.  The atomized individualism inherited 
from the nineteenth-century liberalism was connected to the state by the “solid cement of 
national sentiment.”  Hannah Arendt, The Nation, in ESSAYS IN UNDERSTANDING 1930-1945, at 
206, 209 (Jerome Kohn, ed., 1994). 
 137. See GEORGE A. BERMANN ET AL., CASES & MATERIALS ON EUROPEAN UNION LAW 
3-5 (2002); Robert Schuman, Fr. Foreign Minister, Declaration of 9 May 1950 (May 9, 1950), 
available at http://europa.eu/abc/symbols/9-may/decl_en.htm (“The pooling of coal and steel 
production will immediately provide for the setting-up of common bases for economic 
development as a first step in the federation of Europe, and will change the destinies of those 
regions which have long been devoted to the manufacture of munitions of war, of which they 
have been the most constant victims.”). 
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the deterioration of group solidarity and belonging in the modern 
period. 
However, the appeal to the group or collectivity still resonates.138  
Groups still “matter.”  It is still possible to refer to ethnic or cultural 
solidarity, and the importance of “cultural diversity” testifies to a 
general recognition that we also see cultures and groups as irreducible 
to mere aggregates of individuals.  Some commentators have sought 
to portray the EC as an inflexible mechanism moving towards 
assimilation and normalization, to the detriment of particularities.139  
This view has assumed the negative to be true as well: namely, that 
group rights will, for better or worse, occasion an erosion of the 
individual rights framework on which the European legal order is 
premised.  A basic assumption of this Article is that such a reductive 
approach fails to appreciate the potential complementarity of 
individual and group rights.  Indeed, to the extent that failure to 
accommodate minority languages into the Community legal 
framework provides an excuse for otherwise integration-sympathetic 
groups to subvert the integration process, the destiny of the EC may 
be, in part, tied up with the destiny of minority language groups.140 
An oft-cited example of a strong group rights language is found 
in Article 27 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, which states: 
In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities 
exist, persons belonging to such minorities shall not be denied the 
right, in community with other members of their group, to enjoy 
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to 
use their own language.141 
 
 138. Dwight Newman provides the example of Québecois secession as an example of the 
moral resonance of group-thinking.  According to Newman, supporters of secession do not say 
“there are seven million Québecois that desire secession, therefore secession is obligated.”  
Instead, appeals to independence refer to a “distinct culture, a distinct identity, and so on.”  See 
Newman, supra note 129, at 145.  Of course, the appeal to a group necessarily depends on a 
multiplicity of persons, but the persuasiveness of the argument for a group right (for example, a 
right to secession) does not depend on the number of persons.  The relevance of numbers is at 
best tangentially relevant. 
 139. Padoa-Schioppa discusses these critiques in EUROPA, supra note 125, at 70-72. 
 140. Cf. Addis, supra note 74, at 725-26 (“The choice, therefore, is not between national 
unity on the one hand and the acknowledgement and affirmation of linguistic differences on the 
other hand.  Rather, the issue is what institutional structures would enable us to strengthen 
national unity while affirming and cultivating linguistic diversity.”). 
 141. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 27, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 
171 [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
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The rights themselves are vested in individuals, but only those 
individuals who are members of a cultural group.  Therefore, a 
necessary precondition to the vesting of any rights under Article 27 in 
individual “persons belong to . . . minorities” is the existence of a 
group.142  Article 27 refers outward toward an extant cultural situation.  
Because it relies on a descriptive state of cultural affairs, it is different 
than merely a grant of group rights to certain collectivities.  It is also 
different than a general and universal individual right to associate, 
because here, again, the law refers outward to certain extant groups. 
Another example, discussed supra in Part I.B, is the Italian 
Republic’s 1999 Law passed pursuant to Article 6 of the Italian 
Constitution.  That law mandates certain guarantees that the 
government must provide to members of enumerated cultural and 
linguistic minorities.143  Indeed, that law in many respects goes much 
further than Article 27.  Not only does the law prevent discrimination 
against members of certain minorities, but it also provides for 
affirmative rights that members of the minority community may 
invoke in public life.144 
Victor Segesvary’s distinction here between sui generis group 
rights and quasi-group rights is helpful.  Sui generis group rights are 
“derived from the constitution of a specific social and cultural 
environment by groups of men, having its distinctive symbolic 
orderings, belief- and value-systems, and particularly important, 
shared historic experience.”145  Sui generis group rights are invoked so 
that a community may flourish.146  The group language rights 
discussed in this article are sui generis group rights.  Quasi-group 
rights (for example, rights for the disabled, gay rights) arise merely 
because of accidental or biological facts that link the individuals 
together into the group.147  There is no cultural commonality of 
homosexual persons or disabled persons: there are merely 
homosexual and disabled persons across numbers of cultures.  The sui 
generis group right aims to protect cultural or linguistic communities 
as a legal subject independent of the individual members of that 
group.148 
 
 142. Id. 
 143. See supra notes 24, 28-30 and accompanying text. 
 144. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. 
 145. Segesvary, supra note 132, at 102. 
 146. Id. 
 147. See id. 
 148. Id. 
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Other group or collective rights are based on the aggregative 
interests of the individual members that constitute the group, and are 
thus distinguishable from sui generis group rights.  A labor union is an 
example of such a collectivity.  It may be important to protect the 
right for labor to organize, but it makes no sense to say that the 
United Auto Workers (UAW) itself has a right to exist.  Instead, its 
members each possess an individual right to organize.  The right, 
though, is functional, and does not depend on an extant situation, but 
rather the possibility and potential for different organizations and 
groupings in the future.  In the case of a union, the “group” right is 
merely an aggregative right of the individual members.  If ever the 
members decided that a greater number preferred a splinter union, 
then the UAW would perhaps cease to exist, and no one would 
lament the violation of its “rights.” 
An illustrative example of a group right—as distinguished from a 
mere aggregate of individual rights—is a special fishing right granted 
to an indigenous community.149  Let us suppose that the state grants to 
members of that community the right to fish in the salmon-rich 
streams that run through the community’s traditional homeland year-
round.  These fishing rights are at once individual rights and group 
rights.  For any non-fishing individual, it may be sensible to trade his 
rights for an alternative privilege or payment.  More interestingly, 
other individuals may garner a personal satisfaction, unrelated to 
their community-belonging, from fishing.  For example, maybe it is 
cheaper to fish than to buy at market, or perhaps it is a day’s ride to 
the next comparable stream.  However, assuming the state could 
grant some substitutive privilege or payment to compensate for the 
aggregate individual interests, the individual would not suffer, but the 
community would.150  In this example, the sui generis group right is 
intended as the bulwark to protect the community from suffering even 
if the individuals are “bought off.”  The sui generis group right 
recognizes the intrinsic value of the group and cannot be derived 
from the rights of the individual members.151 
 
 149. See Newman, supra note 129, at 156-57. 
 150. See id. at 157. 
 151. Cf. Id. at 156 (“[W]e can say that his individual interests, while not wholly derivative 
from, are nonetheless secondary to the primary collective interest.”). 
03__WEBER.DOC 10/4/2007  9:52:56 AM 
2007] INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND GROUP RIGHTS 389 
B. The EC and Individual Rights 
From the perspective of the Member States, integration is 
fundamentally a process of surrendering sovereignty.  Member States 
formerly exerted plenary powers over their internal markets, foreign 
affairs, and borders; now, with the expansion of qualified majority 
voting, the extent of Member State participation in those 
fundamental competences can be as minimal as casting a losing vote 
against a majority of other states.152  From the inception of the 
European Economic Community (EEC), minorities subject to the 
centralized policies of the Member States “hoped that the progress 
towards integration would occasion a diminution” of Member State 
authority and a concomitant increase in autonomy for regions and the 
minorities that often have greater leverage on the sub-state level.153  
Expectations were high that the EC’s approach would create a one-
way ratchet, moving inevitably to more minority protection. 
The Community institutions have fallen short of these 
aspirations, and Member States, discussed supra, have, with varying 
success and enthusiasm, propped up the minority and regional 
languages with a protective legal framework.  The reason for the EC’s 
failure is that the EC has opted for an individual rights—and not a 
group rights154—approach to realize its overarching goal that the 
 
 152. The ECJ, in Van Gend en Loos, describes the Community as “a new legal order of 
international law for the benefit of which states have limited their sovereign rights.”  Case 26/62, 
Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 1963 E.C.R. 1.  The EC has 
become increasingly active in the day-to-day affairs of its citizens, having largely accomplished 
its goal of market integration, and recently moving toward a substantive concept of citizenship.  
See, e.g., Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691.  The surrender of 
state sovereignty in the field of application of the Treaties is necessary for the achievement of 
the Treaties’ objectives.  While such surrender was integral to the European economic 
integration, the process exacted (and exacts today) a price on the protection of cultural and 
linguistic minorities. 
 153. de Witte, supra note 108, at 277.  Hopes that integration would allow for the 
development of a “Europe of Regions” relied on a neofunctionalist conception of a EC that 
forges connections and linkages between substate and suprastate groups that ultimately weaken 
the exclusive power of the Member States.  For an elaboration on the neofunctionalist 
conception of integration, see generally Paul Craig, The Nature of the Community, in THE 
EVOLUTION OF E.U. LAW 1, 49 ( Paul Craig & Gr’ainne de Búrca eds., 1999). 
 154. Nathan Glazer has written on these dueling approaches to rights of minorities in the 
context of race in the United States.  He suggests that multicultural nations (and by analogy, 
supranational polities like the EC) all must engage in a debate over which rights approach to 
take to further justice.  See NATHAN GLAZER, ETHNIC DILEMMAS: 1964-1982, at 254-70 (1983).  
A similar debate has raged the past few decades in American Equal Protection jurisprudence.  
For the most part, the Supreme Court has taken an individual rights approach to the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976); Regents of the University 
of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978); Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Education, 476 U.S. 267 
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“internal market shall comprise an area without internal frontiers in 
which the free movement of goods, persons, services, and capital is 
ensured.”155  Individual market actors are the constitutive atoms of the 
European Union.  Minority group rights, which have been the subject 
of so much Member State law, do not fit easily into—and indeed may 
be at odds with—this market-based framework.156  The concept of sui 
generis group rights—and the idea that linguistic minorities may be 
irreducible legal subjects—has not yet entered into the mainstream 
vocabulary of Community institutions. 
Europe’s legal space is now defined by two sets of actors (EC 
institutions and Member State governments) and the resulting form 
of governance has naturally had an effect on citizens’ rights.  The 
transfer of sovereignty from Member States to the Community 
interrupts the relationship between the individual and the state as 
dispenser of rights.157  The ECJ has held that the European treaties 
create directly effective rights that individuals can rely on against 
their Member States and EC institutions.158  These legal entitlements 
are the implements that have driven the economic integration of 
Europe.  The directly effective Community economic rights, however, 
have collateral reverberations felt throughout Europe as a community 
of nations or language groups (as distinguished from a community of 
markets), and despite the EC’s undeniable overtures to minority 
 
(1980); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).  However, dicta from the Court’s recent decision in Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), may suggest an increased willingness to look at group rights, at 
least for a period of time.  See Grutter, 539 U.S. at 342 (Justice O’Connor’s comment that the 
court “expect[s] that 25 years from now, the use of racial preferences will no longer be 
necessary” seems to suggest that a group rights approach may be necessary for a period of 
time). 
 155. EC Treaty art. 14(2). 
 156. Biscoe believes the “ethos of European integration” sees regional cultural diversity as 
“an optional extra” which is sacrificed in the drive to create the single market and the 
perception of a need to remain competitive in the global economy.  Biscoe, supra note 88, at 90.  
Where marketplace issues conflict with cultural diversity, the market will always win.  He closes 
his article with a remonstration to minority groups: “Minority nations, and multi-nation states 
which are concerned that European economic integration has implications for their cultural 
diversity, should take note.”  Id. at 99. 
 157. See Jacqueline Bhabha, Citizenship and Post-National Rights in Europe, 51 INT’L SOC. 
SCI. J. 11 (1999).  Professor Bhabha sees in European integration a useful context to examine 
the interaction between the role of the state and the role of supranational bodies in enforcing 
citizens’ rights. 
 158. See, e.g., Case 26/62, Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen, 
1963 E.C.R. 1.  Moreover, the EC Treaty creates rights that may be invoked to limit private 
actions as well.  See also Case C-43/75, Defrenne v. Société Anonyme Belge de Navigation 
Aérienne Sabena, 1976 E.C.R. 455. 
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groups,159 these effects can destabilize the group rights framework of 
the Member States.  This destabilizing effect will only amplify as EC 
individual rights continue to expand beyond traditional market-
oriented rights into substantive social and political norms.  This 
phenomenon will be discussed infra in more depth,160 but for the 
moment it suffices to point out that some domestic rules that aim to 
ensure group language rights are bound to conflict with fundamental 
principles of Community law.  The EC’s approach to minority 
language has been handicapped by its failure to recognize the sui 
generis subjectivity of language groups.  The individualist emphasis of 
the Community institutions is a major cause for this failure. 
C. Articles 12 and 39 
EC Treaty articles 39161 and 12162 exemplify how individual 
economic rights at the Community level can conflict with Member 
States’ efforts to protect groups of citizens.  Both articles prohibit 
discrimination on the basis of nationality and are among the most 
important to the integration effort.163  Article 39’s prohibition aims to 
secure the freedom of movement for workers, and Article 12 is a 
general prohibition of such discrimination “within the scope of 
application” of the Treaty.  Article 12 has been described as a right to 
equal treatment, while Article 39 has been considered more limited, 
 
 159. See supra discussion Part I.F.  See also de Witte, supra note 108, at 288.  Prof. de Witte 
posits that the prevailing ethos at the various EU intergovernmental conferences was that 
economic integration affected linguistic communication only informally, in contrast to the 
formal political decision to focus on a common market.  Id.  His article was written in 1992, so 
one must wonder if his impressions were different at the Amsterdam conference.  Id. 
 160. See infra discussion Part IV. 
 161. Article 39 provides that “freedom of workers shall be secured within the Community.”  
Moreover, “such freedom of movement shall entail the abolition of any discrimination based on 
nationality between workers of the Member States as regards employment, remuneration and 
other conditions of work or employment.”  EC Treaty art. 39.  Article 39 has direct effect, but 
was also implemented by Regulation 1612/68.  See Case C-36/75, Rutili v. Minister for the 
Interior, 1975 E.C.R. 1219.  This article also has horizontal direct effect, as established in Case 
C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139 paras. 34-36. 
 162. Article 12 provides, “Within the scope of this Treaty, and without prejudice to any 
special provisions contained therein, any discrimination on grounds of nationality shall be 
prohibited.”  EC Treaty art. 12. 
 163. Prof. John Handoll anticipated the import of Article 39 (then Article 48) when he 
wrote that the ECJ’s approach to Article 39 in the decades before Martinez Sala reflected the 
underlying belief that a “worker is more than a just worker; he is an embryonic Community 
citizen.”  John Handoll, Article 48(4) EEC and Non-National Access to Public Employment, 13 
EURO. L. REV. 223, 240 (1988). 
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as it applies only to workers.164  Paragraph 4 exempts public service 
employment from the scope of Article 39, in addition to general 
public policy, security, and health.165  The commitment to creating a 
single frontier-less market relies on a mobile labor supply moving 
efficiently and without obstacles to where it is valued most.  Articles 
12 and 39 aim to make free supply of labor a reality by vesting rights 
with individual workers and EU citizens.166  By eradicating parochial 
discrimination in the labor market, the EC not only ensures fair 
treatment, but affirmatively encourages the movement of workers.167 
An obvious conflict between Article 39 and a Member State 
minority group right would be a hypothetical rule passed by the 
autonomous Spanish region of Catalonia requiring local businesses to 
employ a specified percentage of Catalonian residents in factories.  
Article 3 of Regulation 1612/68 explains that even “indirect” 
discrimination on the basis of nationality is prohibited under Article 
39.168  Thus, such a provision would be a clear violation of Regulation 
1612/68 since Catalonian residents are predominantly Spanish 
citizens.  Such a law would threaten the free movement of workers 
that Article 39 and Regulation 1612/68 aim to achieve.  Such a law 
would patently be designed to have a protectionist, anti-integration 
discriminatory effect that benefits a group at the expense of 
individual labor market actors.  The nexus between the hypothetical 
law and Article 39 is all too clear. 
 
 164. Annette Schrauwen, Sink or Swim Together? Developments in European Citizenship, 
23 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 778, 780 (2000). 
 165. See EC Treaty art. 39(4).  The ECJ case law has all but read the exceptions out of the 
text of Article 39 and their implementing directive 64/221.  For example, in Rutili the court held 
that in order for the public policy exception to apply, the discrimination must be justified by 
Community public policy concerns, not Member State concerns.  Rutili, 1975 E.C.R. at 1223.  
See also Case C-33/88, Allué v. Università di Venezia, 1989 E.C.R. 1591 para. 7 (limiting “public 
service” exception to the exercise of “direct or indirect participation in the exercise of powers 
conferred by public law and . . . the discharge of functions whose purpose is to safeguard the 
general interests of the State or of other public authorities and which therefore require a special 
relationship of allegiance to the State on the part of persons occupying them and reciprocity of 
rights and duties which form the bond of nationality”). 
 166. “For example, if a Spaniard cannot get a job as a machinist in Germany because there 
are arbitrary language requirements, or because the local council will not provide housing, or 
because his Moroccan wife will be excluded, or because he has to purchase costly visa 
requirements, then his free movement will be hampered.”  Bhabha, supra note 157, at 14. 
 167. See e.g., Á. Castro Oliveira, Workers and Other Persons: Step-By-Step from Movement 
to Citizenship, Case Law 1995-2001, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 77 (2002). 
 168. Regulation 1612/68, 1968 J.O. (L 257) 1 (EEC). 
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Article 12 articulates a broad commitment to anti-discrimination 
“within the scope of application of [the EC] Treaty.”169  The key 
question, then, is how far the EC Treaty’s “scope of application” 
extends.  If the “scope of application” of the Treaty extends beyond 
workers’ freedom of movement, then Article 12 sweeps even more 
broadly than Article 39.  To the extent that Article 12 embodies the 
same principle but applies it to a wider range of conduct, Article 12 
will only increase in relevance.  By corollary, the non-discrimination 
principle will apply to an increasing array of Member State acts, many 
of which may not facially seem implicated by the Treaty at all.  
Recent cases have confirmed that this is true.170  The expanding 
“scope of application” of the Treaty results from the citizenship 
concept introduced to the EC Treaty at Maastricht.171 
D. Martinez Sala and The Expansion of Individual Citizenship 
Rights 
The ECJ, in the 1998 Martinez Sala case,172 interpreted Article 12 
as applying to all citizens residing lawfully in a Member State.  Ms. 
Sala, a Spanish citizen, had resided in Germany for over thirty years, 
and had been receiving social welfare benefits in the form of a child-
raising allowance since 1986.173  She had entered Germany to work, 
but she had been unemployed for over a decade.174  She had applied 
for a German residence permit, which the authorities were disinclined 
to give her.175  She then applied for her welfare benefits.176  The 
welfare authorities required Ms. Sala to produce a residence permit,177 
which she could not, of course, do.  All persons legally resident in the 
country were eligible for the benefit, but German citizens were 
required only to prove their residence, and foreign nationals had to 
 
 169. EC Treaty art. 12. 
 170. See infra discussion Part II.C. 
 171. The Treaty of Maastricht contained, for the first time, a provision on EU citizenship.  
That provision is now found in EC Treaty art. 18. 
 172. See supra note 113. 
 173. Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691 paras. 2-4. 
 174. Id. 
 175. See id. para. 14.  The German authorities had their hands tied because they did not 
want to issue the permit to a non-worker, but were prohibited from repatriating her by Article 
6(a) of the European Convention on Social and Medical Assistance.  See id. paras. 11-12, 14. 
 176. Id. para. 15. 
 177. Id. para. 16. 
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produce a residence permit.178  Not being able to produce the permit, 
she was denied the benefits.179 
The ECJ ruled that requiring an EU citizen to produce a 
residence permit when German citizens were not so required 
constituted impermissible discrimination on the basis of nationality in 
violation of Article 12.180  Recalling that Article 12 applies “within the 
scope of application of the Treaty,” the ECJ had to decide which 
aspects of the EC Treaty were implicated.181  The ECJ held that the 
child-raising allowance was a family benefit under Regulations 
1612/68 and 1408/71 and thus fell within the scope of the Treaty.182  
Most striking, though, was the ECJ’s separate finding that citizenship 
alone, and not worker status, brought Ms. Sala within the scope of the 
Treaty: “As a national of a Member State, lawfully residing in the 
territory of another Member State, [Ms. Sala] . . . comes within the 
scope ratione personae of the provisions of the Treaty on European 
citizenship.”183  The implication of the holding in Martinez Sala is that 
the individual right to equal treatment attached to the mere fact of 
EU citizenship.184  No longer, it seems, would the ECJ require a nexus 
between the discrimination and the exercise of a community 
economic right (for example, Article 39 and freedom of movement 
for workers).  In the post-Martinez Sala EC, a Member State must 
beware not only of enacting measures that may impede the exercise 
of individual economic rights, but also of discriminating against any 
EU citizens who happen to be in the country legally—even casually. 
Subsequent cases have confirmed this strong view of EU 
citizenship as a political and social, and not merely economic, right.  
The Trojani case, for example, involved a French national applying 
for social assistance benefits in Belgium.185  The ECJ directed the 
Belgian courts to determine whether the petitioner fell within the 
ambit of any of Articles 39, 43 (applying to the freedom of 
establishment), or 49 (applying to the freedom to provide services) of 
 
 178. Id. paras. 49-50. 
 179. Id. paras. 16-17. 
 180. Id. paras. 64-65. 
 181. Id. para. 62. 
 182. Id. paras. 39-45. 
 183. Id. para. 61. 
 184. The EU Constitution, if ratified, would make this principle of individual rights flowing 
from citizenship explicit in the Treaty text. 
 185. Case C-456/02, Trojani v. Centre Public d’Aide Social de Bruxelles, 2004 E.C.R. I-
07573 paras. 9-10 (Sept. 7, 2004). 
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the EC Treaty.186  However, even if the Belgian courts answered that 
question negatively, the ECJ observed that 
a citizen of the [European] Union who does not enjoy a right of 
residence in the host Member State under Articles 39 EC, 43 EC or 
49 EC may, simply as a citizen of the Union, enjoy a right of 
residence there by direct application of Article 18(1) EC.  The 
exercise of that right is subject to the limitations and conditions 
referred to in that provision. . . .  However, once it is ascertained 
that a person in a situation such as that . . . is in possession of a 
residence permit, he may rely on Article 12 EC in order to be 
granted social assistance benefit[s.]187 
The ECJ cited to Martinez Sala and Trojani in the 2005 case Queen 
(on the application of Dany Bidar) v. London Borough of Ealing.188  
In Bidar, the Court summarized the Trojani case as establishing that 
“a citizen of the Union who is not economically active may rely on 
the first paragraph of Article 12 EC where he has been lawfully 
resident in the host Member State for a certain time or possesses a 
residence permit.”189  Bidar held that an EU citizen’s rights under 
Article 12 prohibited the United Kingdom from conditioning receipt 
of subsidized school loans on a student’s “settlement” in the 
country.190  The British government conceded that under the terms of 
the “settlement” provision of the loan regulation, most non-British 
Community students would be “unsettled” despite being legally 
resident in the country.191  The ECJ expressly disavowed the holdings 
in the earlier Lair192 and Brown193 cases, which had held that the 
assistance was primarily related to education and social policy and 
therefore not within the scope of the Treaty.194 
 
 186. Id. para. 27. 
 187. Id. para. 46; accord Case C-184/99, Grzelczyk v. Centre Public d’Aide Sociale, 2001 
E.C.R. I–6193 (“[A] citizen of the European Union, lawfully resident in the territory of a host 
Member State, can rely on Article 6 [now Article 12] of the Treaty in all situations which fall 
within the scope ratione materiae of Community law.  Those situations include those involving 
the exercise of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed by the Treaty and those involving the 
exercise of the right to move and reside freely in another Member State, as conferred by Article 
8a [now Article 18] of the Treaty.”). 
 188. See Case C-209/03, In Re Dany Bidar v. London Borough of Ealing paras. 23, 27,  2005 
E.C.R. I-2119. 
 189. Id. para. 37. 
 190. Id. para. 63. 
 191. Id. para. 67. 
 192. Case C-39/86, Lair v. Universitat Hannover, 1988 E.C.R. I-3161. 
 193. Case C-197/86, Brown v. Sec’y of State for Scotland, 1988 E.C.R. I-3205. 
 194. Id. para. 38-39; Lair, 1988 E.C.R. I-3161 para. 15. 
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Moreover, in 2004, the European Council and the European 
Parliament promulgated Directive 2004/38, which governs the free 
movement of EU citizens.195  Thus, in part, Directive 2004/38 
supplants Regulation 1612/68, discussed supra in Part II.C, which 
addressed the free movement of workers—a more limited subset of 
individuals.196  The directive provides inter alia standards according to 
which “Union citizens” (defined as nationals of a Member State) are 
to be permitted entry to, residence in, and exit from other Members 
States.197  Importantly, the directive creates a near-absolute “right of 
residence” during the three months following entry into the host 
Member State.198  Beyond three months, EU citizens may remain in a 
host Member State provided they are studying (with health 
insurance), working, conducting business, or even merely in 
possession of sufficient resources to avoid becoming a burden on the 
host Member State’s social assistance system.199  Most important for 
our purposes is Article 24.1, which codifies the equal treatment 
principle flowing from Martinez Sala: 
Subject to such specific provisions as are expressly provided for in 
the Treaty and secondary law, all Union citizens residing on the 
basis of this Directive in the territory of the host Member State 
shall enjoy equal treatment with the nationals of that Member State 
within the scope of the Treaty.200 
While the directive does provide the ubiquitous general reservations 
for “public policy, public security or public health,”201 there is no 
exception for group-protective measures designed to protect minority 
languages.202 
Martinez Sala and Directive 2004/38 affect the minority language 
problem only by implication.  Ms. Sala, for instance, had nothing to 
do with Germany’s efforts to protect languages or minorities; she was 
denied a simple welfare benefit and the ECJ found that denial was in 
violation of her rights as an EU citizen to be free from 
discrimination.203  Before evaluating the impact of Martinez Sala’s 
expansive concept of citizenship on Member State protections of 
 
 195. Council Directive 2004/38, 2004 O.J. (L 158). 
 196. See id.  See also Regulation 1612/68, supra note 168. 
 197. See Council Directive 2004/38, supra note 195, arts. 5-7. 
 198. See id. art. 6.1. 
 199. Id. art. 7.1. 
 200. Id. art. 24.1 (emphasis added). 
 201. Id. art. 27.1. 
 202. See generally id. 
 203. Case C-85/96, Martinez Sala v. Freistaat Bayern, 1998 E.C.R. I-2691 para. 23. 
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minority languages, it is necessary to survey the actual ECJ rulings in 
cases where group language rights collide with individual Community 
rights. 
III.  MAJOR ECJ CASES ADDRESSING CONFLICT BETWEEN 
MINORITY LANGUAGE RIGHTS AND COMMUNITY 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS 
The ECJ interprets the European treaties, and to the extent a 
Member State law limits the full enjoyment of the freedoms and 
rights provided by the treaties and Community law, the ECJ is 
charged with affirming the supremacy of Community law204 and 
declaring the domestic measure to be in conflict.  The ECJ decisions 
in this field have articulated and defined the principles of non-
discrimination and freedom of workers and persons.  Since the 
treaties are concerned with individual rights, the ECJ in its role as 
treaty interpreter, has usually found Member State measures to 
protect language groups in violation of Community law. 
A. The Groener205 Case 
The Groener case involved a 1979 Irish Ministry of Education 
regulation that required schoolteachers to pass an Irish language 
proficiency exam as a precondition to attaining a permanent post.206  
When Ms. Groener, a Dutch national and art teacher, failed her test, 
she was denied a position over the objection of the school that desired 
to hire her.207  Groener alleged that the regulation violated Article 39 
(then Article 48) and, in particular, was not justified by Article 3(1) of 
the implementing Regulation 1612/68 which permits states to 
condition employment on linguistic knowledge when “required by 
reason of the nature of the post to be filled.”208 
 
 204. Unlike the U.S. Constitution, the European treaties do not contain an explicit textual 
foundation for the supremacy of Community law.  The ECJ has guided the affirmation of 
Community supremacy through its case law.  See Case 6/65, Costa v. Ente Nazionale Per 
L’Energia Elettrica (ENEL), 1964 E.C.R. 585 (holding that in cases of conflict, Community law 
must be supreme over domestic law because to hold otherwise would render the direct 
applicability and direct effect of Community law meaningless).  Costa also reminded Member 
States that, by entering into the EC, they have limited their sovereign rights.  Id. 
 205. Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister for Educ. and City of Dublin Vocational Educ. 
Comm., 1989 E.C.R. 3967. 
 206. See id. para. 2. 
 207. See id. 
 208. See id. para. 3; see also Regulation 1612/68, supra note 168, art. 3(1). 
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The ECJ held that the regulation did not violate Community law 
for a combination of reasons.  The Court attached importance to the 
official primary constitutional status of the Irish language.209  Pointing 
out the concerted effort by the Irish government to preserve and 
promote its linguistic heritage, the Court also warned Ireland not to 
go too far: 
The EEC Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy for the 
protection and promotion of a language of a Member State which is 
both the national language and the first official language.  
However, the implementation of such a policy must not encroach 
upon a fundamental freedom such as that of the free movement of 
workers.  Therefore, the requirements deriving from measures 
intended to implement such a policy must not in any circumstances 
be disproportionate in relation to the aim pursued and the manner in 
which they are applied must not bring about discrimination against 
nationals of other Member States.210 
The requirement of proportionality211 was met in Groener for two 
reasons.  First, the “privileged relationship” between a teacher and 
students allowed Article 3(1) to apply beyond instructors teaching the 
Irish language.212  Ireland wanted to protect and promote the 
language, not merely to teach it, and requiring all teachers to be 
competent would encourage spoken Irish in the halls, during recess, 
and in other classes.  Second, the regulation required competency, not 
fluency, in Irish.  A requirement of fluency, the Court suggested, 
could be “disproportionate in relation to the objective pursued.”213  
The Court also warned that any requirement that the language 
certification be acquired within the Member State would be a 
violation of the principle of non-discrimination.214 
At the time, the Groener decision was welcomed cautiously by 
advocates for minority languages and rights.  It appeared the ECJ 
signed off on a regulation aimed to protect the Irish language 
notwithstanding the clear disadvantage to non-Irish teachers 
searching employment in Ireland.  The decision considered the Irish 
language as a subject that could be legally protected.  Perhaps more 
 
 209. See supra note 6 and accompanying text. 
 210. Groener, 1989 E.C.R. 3967 para. 19 (emphasis added). 
 211. Prof. Shuibhne compares the cautious proportionality inquiry to a “general 
international” trend regarding affirmative action.  See Shuibhne, supra note 6, at 71. 
 212. To so require would, as Advocate General Darmon pointed out in his opinion, “treat 
[Irish] as a dead language like [A]ncient [G]reek or [L]atin, and as a language incapable of 
further development.”  Groener, 1989 E.C.R. 3967, Opinion of AG Darmon para. 22. 
 213. Id. para. 21. 
 214. Id. paras. 31-33. 
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importantly, the ECJ was willing to recognize that encouraging the 
usage of minority languages contributed collaterally and indirectly to 
the flourishing of the language’s speakers. 
Commentators wondered how far the Court was willing to 
extend this logic.  Was the ECJ willing to provide a “real recognition 
of the legitimacy of national concerns in relation to national cultural 
heritage?” 215  Or was this case an outlying situation, limited to the 
Irish anomaly of constitutional recognition and primacy of the 
minority group’s language?  Would the same analysis hold when the 
language was protected only regionally?  The subsequent cases 
dispelled hopes that the ECJ was willing to recognize a general 
Member State interest in providing sui generis group rights to 
minority language speakers. 
B. The Bickel/Franz216 Case 
Bickel/Franz came before the ECJ on a preliminary reference217 
from a criminal court in the Trentino-Alto Adige region of Italy on 
the Austrian border.218  Article 100 of the Statute for the region219 
provided a special right for German-speaking residents of the region 
to have any legal proceedings against them conducted in German.220  
Bickel, who was an Austrian lorry driver, was being prosecuted for 
driving under the influence.221  Franz, a German tourist, had been 
charged with possession of an illegal weapon after a customs search.222  
Neither spoke Italian, and accordingly petitioned the Italian court to 
conduct the proceedings in German.223  The Italian court referred the 
following question to the ECJ: 
Do the principle of non-discrimination as laid down in the first 
paragraph of Article 6 [now Article 12], the right of movement and 
 
 215. Bryan M.E. McMahon, Case Comment, Groener, 27 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 129, 139 
(1990).  If so, as Prof. McMahon asserted triumphantly, “The bureaucrats and the economists 
will have to recognize that cultural diversity cannot be indiscriminately . . . [swept] in the name 
of economic unity.”  Id. 
 216. Case C-274/96, Criminal Proceedings against Bickel and Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637. 
 217. See EC Treaty art. 234. 
 218. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 paras. 1-4. 
 219. See supra discussion Part I.C. 
 220. Special Statute for the Trentino-Alto Adige Region, Presidential Decree No. 670/1992, 
art. 100, available at http://www.regione.taa.it/GIUNTA/normativa_it/statuto/statuto_ 
speciale.pdf.  Cf. supra Part I.C. 
 221. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 3. 
 222. Id. para. 4. 
 223. Id. para. 5. 
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residence for citizens of the Union as laid down in Article 8a [now 
Article 18] and the freedom to provide services as laid down in 
Article 59 [now Article 49] of the Treaty require that a citizen of 
the Union who is a national of one Member State but is in another 
Member State be granted the right to have criminal proceedings 
against him conducted in another language where nationals of the 
host State enjoy that right in the same circumstances?224 
The ECJ separated the referral into two questions: first, did the right 
at question implicate the Treaty?; and second, if the treaty was 
implicated, could the region limit the application of that right to 
residents of the region?225 
The Court ruled that the regulation did implicate the individual 
Treaty rights of Bickel and Franz.226  Article 12 required that in any 
situation governed by Community law, EU citizens be placed on 
“equal footing” with citizens of the respective Member States.227  The 
“linguistic rights and privileges of individuals” merited the Court’s 
strictest attention.228  The mere fact that Bickel and Franz were EU 
citizens exercising their right to free movement under Article 18 of 
the EC Treaty229 implicated the Treaty and as such, the prohibition of 
discrimination contained in Article 12 applied.230  The Court also 
relied on Article 49, and the freedom to receive services, as an 
alternate basis for asserting jurisdiction.231  The Treaty applied despite 
 
 224. Id. para. 11. 
 225. The ECJ, not to be outdone in prolixity, reformulated the referral thus: “the national 
court is essentially asking whether the right conferred by national rules to have criminal 
proceedings conducted in a language other than the principal language of the State falls within 
the scope of the Treaty and must accordingly comply with Article [12] thereof.  If so, the 
national court also asks whether Article [12] of the Treaty precludes national rules, such as 
those in issue, which, in respect of a particular language other than the principal language of the 
Member State concerned, confer on citizens whose language is that particular language and who 
are resident in a defined area the right to require that criminal proceedings be conducted in that 
language, without conferring the same right on nationals of other Member States traveling or 
staying in that area, whose language is the same.”  Id. para. 12. 
 226. See id. para. 14. 
 227. Id. 
 228. Id. para. 13 (emphasis added). 
 229. Article 18 is the same provision the ECJ relied on, that same year, to decide Martinez 
Sala. 
 230. Id. para. 17.  In Bickel/Franz, the ECJ refers to Article 6, which was the precursor to 
Article 12.  After the judgment came down, virtually all the treaty articles were renumbered by 
the Treaty of Amsterdam.  See BERMANN ET AL., supra note 137, at 23. 
 231. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 15. 
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the fact that criminal proceedings are normally an internal affair, 
reserved to the exclusive discretion of the Member States.232 
In response to the second question, the ECJ found the 
discrimination to be in violation of Article 12 non-discrimination 
principle.233  The Italian government, in its brief, stressed that the 
scope of the right was to accommodate an insular minority, and its 
aim was “to recognize the ethnic and cultural identity of persons 
belonging to the protected minority.”234  Essentially, the Italian 
government staked its case on a group rights justification.  Its 
argument implicitly recognized the rights of Bickel and Franz qua 
Community citizens, but contended that those rights were satisfied by 
the availability of translators.235  The special right reserved for 
German-speaking residents did not apply to nonresident German 
speakers simply because those persons were not part of the minority 
group Italy aimed to protect.236  The Court instead focused on the 
reality that, on the ground, and regardless of Italy’s motivation, 
German-speakers from Austria and Germany were at a disadvantage 
compared to German-speaking Alto Adige residents.237  The Court 
 
 232. The ECJ had already held that Community law set certain limits to the discretion of 
Member States in the field of criminal law.  See Case 186/87, Cowan v. Trésor Public, 1989 
E.C.R. 195; see also Case 137/84, Ministère Publique v. Heinrich Maria Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 
2681.  In Cowan, a British national, exercising his Community right to receive services in 
France, was injured and sought compensation pursuant to a French penal law that provided 
restitution to victims of assault.  Cowan, 1989 E.C.R. 195 paras. 2-3.  The ECJ held that France 
must extend the privilege to the British national in order to avoid violating Article 12.  Id. para. 
20.  Additionally, in Mutsch, a German-speaking Luxembourg national was arrested in Belgium 
and sought to have proceedings conducted in German as Belgian law allows for German-
speaking Belgian citizens.  Mutsch, 1985 E.C.R. 2681 paras. 2-3.  The Court drew on Article 39 
and the free movement of workers guaranteed by Regulation 1612/68 and ruled that Belgium 
could not deny Mutsch, a lawful resident worker in Belgium, the right to have proceedings 
conducted in German.  Id. paras. 14-18.  It will be observed that Bickel/Franz brings a nearly 
identical legal issue before the court, with the key difference being the non-applicability of 
Article 39 and the freedom of movement for workers. 
 233. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 31. 
 234. Id. para. 21. 
 235. See id. 
 236. The same argument was put forward by the Italian government when it intervened in 
the Mutsch case.  See Palermo, supra note 2, at 304-05.  See also Andrea Gattini, La non 
discriminazione di cittadini comunitari nell’uso della lingua nel processo penale: il caso Bickel, 82 
RIVISTA DI DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE 106, 107 (1999) (“Il principale argomento avanzato dal 
Governo era che le norme nazionali adottate a tutela di una minoranza ufficialmente 
riconosciuta potessero riguardare soltanto le persone appartenenti a detta minoranza e residenti 
nella zona in cui fosse insediata.”). 
 237. See Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 25 (“The majority of Italian nationals whose 
language is German are in a position to demand that German be used throughout the 
proceedings in the Province of Bolzano, because they meet the residence requirement laid down 
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framed Article 100 as a protection of German-speakers in Alto 
Adige; the Italian government claimed Article 100 protected only 
members of the Alto Adige German-speaking minority. 
In its decision, the Court reaffirmed that for a residence 
requirement to be permissible under Community law, it must be 
based on objective criteria independent of nationality as well as 
proportionate to the legitimate aim of the national provisions.238  
Furthermore, the Court repeated what it had stated in Groener: 
protecting a linguistic minority is a legitimate objective.239  In this case, 
however, the Court found Article 100 of the Statute to be 
disproportionate since the rights could be extended with little 
expense to cover German-speaking nationals of other Member States 
exercising their right to freedom of movement.240  To summarize 
Advocate General Jacobs’ argument, protecting a local linguistic 
minority is perfectly in harmony with the Treaty, but denying visitors 
the right to use German was neither necessary nor appropriate to 
achieve that goal.241  The Court agreed with the Advocate General, 
noting, “It does not appear . . . from the documents before the Court 
that that aim would be undermined if the rules in issue were extended 
to cover German-speaking nationals of other Member States 
exercising their right to freedom of movement.”242 
For those waiting for the ECJ to adopt a hands-off approach 
regarding Member State protections of minority languages in the 
aftermath of Groener, Bickel/Franz is a staggering blow.  For 
Austrian and German tourists who cross the frontier into Trentino-
Alto Adige to enjoy the mountains (and all other EU citizens who are 
 
by the rules in issue; the majority of German–speaking nationals of other Member States, on the 
other hand, cannot avail themselves of that right because they do not satisfy that 
requirement.”). 
 238. Id. para. 27. 
 239. Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister for Educ. and City of Dublin Vocational Educ. 
Comm., 1989 E.C.R. 3967 paras. 18-19. 
 240. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 29.  Remember that the region already had a 
bilingual judiciary in place. 
 241. See id., Opinion of A.G. Jacobs para. 41.  See also Barry Doherty, Bickel—Extending 
the Boundaries of European Citizenship?, 8 IR. J. EUR. L. 70, 77-78 (1999) (providing a cogent 
summary of the A.G.’s arguments); Gattini, supra note 236, at 114 (discussing the A.G.’s 
opinion in detail). 
 242. Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 29. 
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more comfortable with German than Italian),243 the case is a welcome 
gesture.244 
Notably absent from the ECJ opinion was consideration of the 
intentional discriminatory effect of the law.  Article 100 was included 
in the Statute to guarantee an efficient and comprehensible trial for 
German-speaking residents; it was also intended to accommodate an 
insular group of German-speakers living in Trentino-Alto Adige, not 
the casual tourist whose links to the region are ephemeral.  
Throughout the opinion, the Court never considers the real policy 
impetus behind Article 100: to protect the German-speaking minority 
group against outside influences (as provided by the Italian 
Constitution) including (one could even say especially) other 
German-speakers.245  The Court’s pronouncements on the per se 
validity of measures to protect linguistic minorities ring hollow if the 
Court is disinclined to consider the very reason for their existence. 
Bickel/Franz suggests that the ECJ is ready to intervene when 
Member State rules designed to protect minority groups conflict with 
the exercise of individual Community rights.  In Bickel/Franz, the 
ECJ elides the real purpose of the provision in question, and focuses 
exclusively on the effect on individuals.  It may be objected that 
Article 100 deals with criminal proceedings, and has little to do with 
preserving culture; the other side of that coin is equally true: even if 
the right is extended to non-residents, no harm is done to the region’s 
interests and purposes.  It is not clear whether extending the language 
right in this case to all German speakers will attenuate the right’s 
force vis-à-vis the German-speaking Alto Adige denizens.246  
However, when combined with the EC’s expansion from a purely 
economic union into a social and political union bound together by 
citizenship, the effects of the ECJ’s failure to countenance group 
rights as a sui generis legal subject can hardly be underestimated.  
 
 243. See Doherty, supra note 241, at 77 (“Behind this dense formulation is an unresolved 
question: what does it mean to say that a person’s language is German? [T]he concept is 
curiously undefined.”). 
 244. Christoph J.M. Safferling, Case Comment, In Re Bickel and Franz, 94 AM. J. INT’L L. 
155, 159 (2000). 
 245. Palermo notes, “Since the South Tyrol [Alto Adige] arrangement is so complex and 
based mainly on the protection of a minority group against outside influences, particularly by 
making immigration to South Tyrol difficult, it is not surprising that portions of this legislation 
conflict with EC law.”  Palermo, supra note 2, at 309. 
 246. In this case, there was no evidence that extending the right to all German speakers 
would increase court costs.  See Bickel/Franz, 1998 E.C.R. I-7637 para. 30. 
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Indeed, the deleterious effects of such an approach are presented in 
the Angonese case, discussed next. 
C. The Angonese247 Case 
In Angonese, the ECJ had occasion to reexamine the conflict in 
Groener between non-discriminatory access to employment against 
the legitimacy of procedures for gauging linguistic competence.  In 
that case, the Court again fielded a preliminary reference from a local 
Italian court in Trentino-Alto Adige.248  The case involved an 
applicant to a position at a local private bank, the Cassa di Risparmio 
di Bolzano.249  Roman Angonese applied to enter into a competition 
for advertised positions at the bank.250  The advertisement stipulated 
that candidates needed to possess a certificate—called the patentino—
as proof of their linguistic competence in both German and Italian.251  
The bank would not accept any other form of certification and the 
province of Bolzano, capital of the Alto Adige, was the only authority 
that administered the patentino examination.252 
When Angonese presented his application, complete with 
documentation from his university training in Vienna that testified to 
his bilinguism, the bank denied him because he did not produce the 
patentino.253  He then brought suit in the local Italian court in 
Bolzano, alleging that the denial of his application violated Article 39 
as well as Regulation 1612/68.  The local court referred the following 
question to the ECJ: 
Is it compatible with Article [39] (1), (2), and (3) of the EC 
Treaty . . . to make the admission of candidates for a competition 
organised to fill posts in a company governed by private law 
conditional on possession of the official certificate attesting to 
knowledge of local languages issued exclusively by a public 
authority of a Member State . . . ?254 
 
 247. Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139. 
 248. Id. para. 1. 
 249. This summary of the facts is based on the reported opinion and a case comment.  See 
Robert Lane & Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Case Comment, Angonese, 37 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 
1237, 1237 (2000). 
 250. Angonese, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139 para. 5. 
 251. Id., Opinion of A.G. Fennelly para. 2. 
 252. Id. 
 253. Id. para. 9. 
 254. Id. para. 15. 
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The first part of the Court’s opinion established the horizontal 
direct effect of Article 39 and Regulation 1612/68.255  Next, the Court 
proceeded to address the merits of the requirement that applicants 
possess the patentino.256  The Court reasoned that since the patentino 
was issued only in Bolzano, and the majority of Bolzano residents are 
Italian, nationals of other Member States were at a disadvantage.257  
The requirement could, as in Bickel/Franz, be justified on the basis of 
proportionality.258  However, by barring candidates from proving their 
ability by any other means, the bank’s action was disproportionate 
and amounted to indirect discrimination in violation of Community 
law.259 
Angonese is further testament to the Court’s willingness to find a 
link to Community law in an increasing variety of legal situations—in 
this case, a private employment relationship.  Again, the Court 
announces that the language requirement is a legitimate state interest, 
but then summarily strikes it down.260  Relying on a dictum from 
Groener, the Court ruled that “the principle of non-discrimination 
precludes any requirement that the linguistic knowledge in question 
must have been acquired within the national territory.”261  In 
Angonese, the Court treats the patentino requirement as though its 
sole aim was to ascertain individual applicants’ knowledge of German 
and Italian.  Again, the Court’s approach is one of institutional 
blindness, as if to say “we rule on individual Community rights, and 
have no competence to consider the purposes of domestic language 
policy.” 
The Court sees the aim of the requirement in different terms 
than the employer and the Bolzano community.  The focus is on the 
Community rights of individuals that speak the minority language, 
 
 255. Id. paras. 15-36.  This portion of the ruling garnished much more attention from 
Community legal scholars than the subsequent ruling on the merits of the requirement.  
Asserting the horizontal direct effect of a fundamental freedom such as the freedom of 
movement for workers contained in Article 39 is indeed a momentous development in 
Community law, and will undoubtedly undercut efforts to protect minority languages by 
prohibiting even private parties from making certain distinctions in favor of the minority 
languages. 
 256. Id. para. 37. 
 257. Id. para. 40. 
 258. Id. para. 42.  Again, the Court pronounced the legitimacy of the aim (in this case, 
ascertaining linguistic competence), and then summarily rejected it.  See id. para. 44. 
 259. Id. paras. 44-46. 
 260. Id. 
 261. Id. para. 43. 
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and not the flourishing of the minority language group itself.262  It is 
almost certain that the bank had adopted a policy requiring the 
patentino in part because it could thus encourage employment among 
local Bolzano residents, and perhaps foster banking relationships with 
the local bilingual population.  In this respect the patentino 
requirement was analogous to the Irish requirement at issue in 
Groener: it served an immediate functional purpose, but also had a 
collateral effect of contributing to the flourishing of the minority 
group.  In the same respect Angonese is different than Bickel/Franz.  
The language right provided to criminal defendants did not 
reverberate collaterally to the benefit of the German-speaking 
community.  However, Angonese is evidence of the dangers of 
extending the Bickel/Franz interpretation of the non-discrimination 
principle to an increasing array of bona fide group rights aimed at 
contributing to the cultural life of minority language groups. 
It may be said that in applying Community law to situations as in 
Angonese, the ECJ is taking “free movement” and “non-
discrimination” to their logical conclusions.  Nevertheless, such a rigid 
formalist approach is rarely required of judicial institutions, and one 
must wonder how prudent such an approach is in the context of 
language.263  Language is always a politically sensitive issue because it 
is so intimately connected with the preservation of regional and 
cultural identity.  To the extent the ECJ’s current approach ignores 
the sui generis nature of group rights, it glosses over this cultural and 
political sensitivity.  The broad interpretation of European citizenship 
flowing from Martinez Sala, Trojani, and Directive 2004/38 means 
that EU citizens will be able to claim community rights in an 
increasing range of scenarios.  As the scope of Community law 
widens, the space for group rights to operate shrinks correspondingly.  
Such a dynamic is, to put it lightly, inadequate for the protection of 
minority language groups. 
 
 262. See id. para. 40 (“Since the majority of residents of the province of Bolzano are Italian 
nationals, the obligation to obtain the requisite Certificate puts nationals of other Member 
States at a disadvantage by comparison with residents of the province.”). 
 263. See Lane & Shuibhne, supra note 249, at 1246 (“Language is a politically sensitive issue 
in any context, but perhaps even more so where it is so intimately connected with the 
preservation and evolution of regional culture.”). 
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D. Beyond Article 12: Moving Toward a New Vocabulary of Sui 
Generis Group Rights 
The inadequacy results from the failure of the EC institutions 
law to conceive of minority language groups as proper subjects of 
Community law.  The proportionality test will almost always result in 
the striking down of Member State’s group protections because the 
Member States’ interests are defined narrowly.  Member States have 
thus signed away most of their sovereign rights to provide any group 
protection that conflicts—even indirectly—with Community Law.  
Member States have a reduced incentive to address minority concerns 
at the group level, since such measures are bound to conflict with the 
freedom of movement of persons and workers, as well as the principle 
of non-discrimination.  The irony is that just as the EC is abandoning 
its exclusive economic field of operation, and developing into a social 
and political union, equal footing for minority languages may very 
well be in jeopardy. 
I believe an alternate approach is available in this context.  When 
Member States grant special group rights to minority language 
groups, they are not violating the non-discrimination principle; 
instead, they are implicitly recognizing the inadequacy of the 
absolutist interpretation of such a principle.  Minority groups merit 
exceptional treatment because their situation is exceptional (or sui 
generis, to again borrow Segesvary’s formulation).264  Insofar as 
Community law fails to recognize this, the minority language groups 
are the first casualty.  Stated differently, the current state of 
Community law lacks a sufficient vocabulary to treat minority 
language groups as legally protectable subjects. 
A comparison to U.S. law may be of value at this juncture.265  
Compare the race segregation of schoolchildren in Brown v. Board of 
Education266 to the discrimination at issue in, for example, Angonese.  
In some respects, the distinctions drawn are similar: individuals 
pertaining to certain groups are afforded different treatment based on 
the mere fact of their belonging to a group.  Only at the most abstract 
level, however, does the analogy hold.  A closer examination of the 
distinction reveals an important difference.  In the case of Brown, the 
distinction drawn between black and white schoolchildren bore no 
 
 264. See Segesvary, supra note 132, at 102. 
 265. Cf. MASSANA, supra note 25, at 136-37 (contrasting Brown and racial segregation in the 
United States with the separation of schoolchildren in Bolzano). 
 266. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
03__WEBER.DOC 10/4/2007  9:52:56 AM 
408 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 17:361 
relation to the aim sought.  During the Jim Crow era, the American 
political establishment may have considered it morally legitimate for 
Southern states to maintain that separate schooling was necessary for 
the development of the schoolchildren.267  At that time, then, it may 
be said that race was therefore inextricably intertwined with the 
education system, and consequently that segregation fostered the 
legitimate policy of education.  But by the 1950s the distinction had 
become sheer arbitrariness.  It no longer was morally or empirically 
possible to maintain that segregating the races aided in the education 
of children.  Stripped of the logical connection to the education 
system, the distinction was nothing more than a pretextual method of 
enforcing an extant social order.  But preserving Southern whites’ 
privileges was not a valid state interest that could justify the 
distinction.268 
 
 267. Of course, this justification was largely pretextual even in the late nineteenth century.  
The cardinal purpose of segregation  was the entrenchment of race hierarchies. See U.S. 
Steelworkers v. Weber, 443  U.S. 193, 208 (1979) (describing affirmative action as “designed to 
break down old patterns of racial segregation and hierarchy”); Johnson v. Transportation 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 628 (1987) (quoting Weber, 443 U.S. at 208); Sanford Levison et al., What 
Are the Facts of Marbury v. Madison, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 255, 275-76 (2003) (criticizing 
Justice Warren’s Brown opinion for its failure to take into account “the history of racial 
segregation in the South and the deep commitment of many of its white citizens to preserving an 
existing racial hierarchy”); Cheryl I. Harris, Equal Treatment and the Reproduction of 
Inequality, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1753, 1767 (2001) (lauding Justice Harlan’s dissenting opinion 
in Plessy v. Ferguson for its insight that “state sponsored segregation violated the Equal 
Protection Claude because . . . the law should not ignore that race-based exclusion was 
intentionally and inherently subordinating”).  There also existed a scientific literature of 
American polygenesis that argued that the races were separate species.  See John Hanson & 
David Yosifon, The Situation: An Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, 
Power Economics, and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129, 314 n.660 (2003) (providing a 
description of the theory of polygenesis, which held that whites and blacks were separate 
species); Brian Willis, Black Bodies, White Science: The Slave Daguerreotypes of Louis Agassiz, 
12 J. BLACKS HIGHER EDUC. 102, 102-03 (1996) (noting that “the American theory of 
polygenesis” popularized by Drs. Louis Agassiz and Samuel Morton purported to prove that 
different “races” were created separately).  The fact that polygenesis was popularized in the 
mid-nineteenth century is no coincidence: as the country spiraled into civil war, it justified 
slavery based on science and religion.  See STEPHEN JAY GOULD, THE MISMEASURE OF MAN 
101-05 (1996).  Moreover, the polygenists used evolution to affirm “that races had been separate 
long enough to evolve major inherited differences in talent and intelligence.”  Id. at 105. 
 268. This discussion of Brown is not intended as a summation of the doctrinal niceties of the 
U.S. Supreme Court’s Fourteenth Amendment jurisprudence as reflected in that case.  Instead, 
it aims merely to articulate a comparison of the challenged discriminatory measures in both 
Brown and Angonese in order to draw an important distinction in the relative state interests at 
stake.  In the case of school segregation at issue in Brown, the American legal and political 
establishment eventually exposed segregation as a morally and legally impermissible 
entrenchment of white privilege.  In the case of the minority protection at issue in Angonese, the 
European legal and political establishment has, on the contrary, affirmed repeatedly the 
legitimacy of the state interest. 
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However, in the case of Angonese, the distinction drawn 
(impliedly, between Bolzano-resident German speakers and other 
German speakers) bore an identifiable relation to the aim of 
contributing to the flourishing of the local community.  The policy in 
Angonese, then, was not a pretextual and protectionist attempt to 
favor entrenched economic interests.  It was not, in short, the sort of 
distinction that the EC has fought against so successfully over the 
years.  Unlike the segregationist motive in Brown, the state interest in 
preserving national culture and languages is not immoral or 
undesirable; indeed, it is subject to continual affirmations to the 
contrary, at both the Community level (indeed, by the ECJ itself) and 
the Member State level. 
Admittedly, the distinction will not always be so clear as it is 
between Brown and Angonese, but the ECJ has the institutional 
expertise and experience of drawing such distinctions.  Throughout its 
history, the ECJ has exhibited boldness and shrewdness in smoking 
out illegitimate protectionist motives disguised as legitimate exercises 
of Member State power.269  The fundamental problem is that the ECJ 
cannot gauge the tightness of the connection between a distinction 
and an aim if it does not recognize the aim for what it truly is.  Instead 
of framing the interest as an accommodation for minority language 
speakers, the ECJ should consider the well-being of the community of 
speakers as a sui generis and irreducible subject of European law. 
The ease with which the ECJ formally endorses the legitimacy of 
protecting minority languages renders this inadequacy all the more 
complicated.  Policymakers and litigants do not need to convince the 
ECJ of the importance of linguistic diversity; from Groener to 
Angonese, the ECJ has expressly recognized the importance of the 
interest.270  Instead, it needs to develop a new vocabulary altogether.  
 
 269. See, e.g., Case 407/85, 3 Glocken GmbH v. USL Centro-Sud, 1988 E.C.R. 4233 (holding 
that Italian rules on pasta composition cannot be used to block pasta imports from other 
Member States); Case 178/84, Comm’n v. Germany, 1987 E.C.R. 1227 (holding that German 
beer purity laws cannot be used to stop importation of beer lawfully produced in other Member 
States); Case 112/84, Humboldt v. Directeur des Service Fiscaux, 1985 E.C.R. 1367 (holding that 
French tax regime was discriminatory when it contained dramatically higher rates for cars that 
no French carmaker produced); Case 120/78, Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung 
Fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), 1979 E.C.R. 649 (holding that German alcohol composition 
laws cannot be used to block importation of lawfully produced spirits). 
 270. See Case 379/87, Groener v. Minister for Educ. and City of Dublin Vocational Educ. 
Comm., 1989 E.C.R. 3967 para. 19 (“The EEC Treaty does not prohibit the adoption of a policy 
for the protection and promotion of a language of a Member State which is both the national 
language and the first official language.”).  See also Case C-281/98, Angonese v. Cassa di 
Risparmio di Bolzano SpA, 2000 E.C.R. I-4139 para. 44 (“[R]equiring an applicant for a post to 
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To start with, the ECJ should recognize that laws protecting a group 
of minority language speakers are not meant purely to maintain the 
number of individuals who are familiar with, or speak, that language.  
If that were true, then it would be enough to assert, as the ECJ has 
often done, that language proficiency requirements are a legitimate 
objective to pursue.  Oftentimes, such laws and measures are 
intended to vest rights only in members of that community to the 
exclusion of non-members.271 
Of course, not all minority-protective domestic laws are equally 
at risk of being struck down under the current framework.  For 
example, the quasi-federal system of the Spanish autonomous 
communities in itself stands little chance of violating the EC Treaty.272  
Similarly, the simple constitutional or codified recognition of multiple 
official languages will certainly not raise eyebrows in Brussels.273  
These protections (especially the latter) are, however, largely 
symbolic.  While the symbolic order of a language group is 
constitutive of that group, and reinforces its sense of identity, a 
language’s long-term survival depends on its ability to remain 
relevant in the lives of its speakers not merely symbolically.  In this 
context, it is not so much the creation of the Catalonian Generalitat274 
that matters as how the Generalitat contributes to the flourishing of 
the Catalonian community—and, by extension, its language.  
However, laws that condition grant substantive rights to individuals 
by virtue of their membership in a linguistic community are most at 
risk, and are almost certain to provoke litigation in the European 
courts.275  As such, even if the procedural protections discussed supra 
do not, in themselves, appear to be on a collision course with the EC 
Treaty, their effectiveness may be undermined by tying the hands of 
the local lawmakers who are unable to provide substantive and 
affirmative protections for local languages. 
This Article has been primarily concerned with laws impeding 
the free movement of workers and EU citizens, and it is true that any 
 
have a certain level of linguistic knowledge may be legitimate and possession of a diploma such 
as the Certificate may constitute a criterion for assessing that knowledge . . . .”). 
 271. Consider, for example, the requirement that a certain percentage of radio and 
television programming be conducted in Catalán.  See supra note 50 and accompanying text. 
 272. See supra Part I.C. 
 273. See supra Part I.C. 
 274. See supra note 46. 
 275. Whether such substantive rights are dispensed from the central government or sub-
state legislative entities is of no moment. 
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domestic laws that place non-members at a disadvantage vis-à-vis 
linguistic community members are at most risk.  However, it is not 
difficult to conceive of minority-protective laws that counteract the 
free movement of services or capital either.  To take a current 
example, the newly amended Statute of Autonomy for Catalonia 
creates a right for individual Catalonians to be served in Catalán.276  If 
a French national perceives a good business opportunity in Catalonia, 
but speaks no Catalán and anticipates serving a primarily Spanish 
client base, can that French businessman obtain redress in the ECJ if 
a barrage of complaints file in from potential Catalán consumers 
complaining of his lack of respect for their language rights?  Or what 
result where an Austrian broadcasting company looking to purchase a 
local radio station in Trentino-Alto Adige to expand its Italian 
coverage decides the transaction is no longer favorable if it must also 
broadcast in German on account of regional or even central 
government regulations mandating a certain percentage of German 
broadcasting?  Rather than declaring a moratorium on such laws, it 
makes more sense to charge the ECJ with an honest inquiry into the 
motives of the Member State (or regional) legislatures promulgating 
the laws. 
CONCLUSION 
Member States may expect more group protective measures to 
be invalidated by the ECJ if there is any link, even a tenuous link, to 
the EC Treaty.  What would follow could be a race to the bottom, 
with the least protective Member States being vindicated because 
their protections extended to minority groups are so paltry as to not 
conflict with the Treaty. 
There is considerable potential for development in the 
interaction of Community law and Member State law with respect to 
minority language rights.  After Bickel/Franz, Angonese, and 
Martinez Sala, the time is ripe for addressing these problems.  What is 
necessary is a recognition of minority language groups as subjects of 
sui generis group rights, as discussed supra in Part II.A.  Assuming the 
ECJ does not alter its course sua sponte, at least three strategies are 
possible.  First, the Member States could explicitly grant competence 
to the EC to address minority language concerns.  In this context, 
Article 151 represents a tentative, though incomplete, step in the right 
direction.  A truly effective competence must include an explicit 
 
 276. See supra notes 58-60 and accompanying text. 
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mention of minority rights, and provide a means of implementation 
that does not require unanimity.  The chief difficulty with such an 
approach is that it displaces the political discussions about minority 
rights away from the Member States to Brussels without tempering 
the general applicability of Article 12’s non-discrimination norm.277  
As we have seen, the Member States and their sub-state units have 
demonstrated more enthusiasm and experience in addressing the 
minority language concerns. 
Second, Member States could temper the rigor with which the 
ECJ interprets the consequences of the individual rights flowing from 
the four freedoms and beyond.  This solution too would require 
Treaty modification.  Perhaps a compromise similar to Article 5’s 
subsidiarity principle could be possible;278 the ECJ would simply look 
the other way when some Member State measures conflict with a 
Community law provision such as the non-discrimination norm.  
Articles I-2 and I-3(3) of the Constitution are promising proposals in 
this regard, but the experience from Article 151 should caution 
against an exaggerated optimism.  More explicit language is likely 
needed in order for the ECJ to approve of group-based preferences 
that conflict with core Community principles enshrined in the 
Treaties. 
Third, Member States could include a directly effective 
affirmative action treaty provision permitting action by Member 
States to ensure substantive equality for minority groups, linguistic or 
otherwise.279  Substantive equality, in this instance, would apply on a 
group basis, with minorities having equal opportunities to witness the 
flourishing of their languages. 
Whatever the action is, the EC should act soon.  The funded 
projects to help preserve minority languages, the soft law 
pronouncements, and the changing mood about European integration 
all testify to the anxiety in the EC that somehow, something must be 
 
 277. For a discussion of the difficulties inhering in selecting a Community-level language 
policy, see Niamh Nic Shuibhne, Does the Draft Constitution Contain a Language Policy?, 
MERCATOR INT’L SYMPOSIUM: EUR. 2004: A NEW FRAMEWORK FOR ALL LANGUAGES? 6 
(Feb. 2004), available at http://www.ciemen.org/mercator/pdf/simp-shuibhne.pdf (last visited 
June 18, 2007). 
 278. See EC Treaty art. 5. 
 279. See EC Treaty art. 141.  Article 141(4) provides, “With a view to ensuring full equality 
in practice between men and women in working life, the principle of equal treatment shall not 
prevent any Member State from maintaining or adopting measures providing for specific 
advantages in order to make it easier for the under-represented sex to pursue a vocational 
activity or to prevent or compensate for disadvantages in professional careers.”  Id. art. 141(4). 
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done to address this tension between individual rights and minority 
group rights.  Given the current stalled state of the integration 
discourse in light of the 2005 vetoes, it may be a particularly 
propitious moment to move ahead.  Of course, the lack of adequate 
protection for minority language rights itself did not hold up the 
ratification of the EU Constitution; however, a decisive step to 
address this and similar problems could provide some momentum in 
the effort to mute the anti-integrationist discourse of Europe as the 
grand destroyer of cultural particularities. 
